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Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: 

The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization 

LoiS R. LIJPJCA• 
"In the growth ofthe law there are periods ofrelative stability and periods 
ofrapid change. "1 
"It sounds good ifyou say itfast."2 
L INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years, commercial law and practice has seen a 
period of rapid change. Since Article 9 of the Unifom Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.i was ratified and widely adopted by the states,4 the country's 
credit markets have burgeoned. We live in a credit economy, and most 
consumers and businesses survive and thrive on the basis of the ready 
availability ofboth long term and short telln credit 
• Associare Plofessor of Law, University of Mallie School or Law. B.S. 1981, Corudl UDiver· 
sity;J.D.I987,Boston University School nfl.aw. 1banks to l. Se<~ll Gould, Dean CoU= A. Klu>uly, 
David Nowlin, Melissa M. Peny, Thomas M. Ward. and Jcunifer Wriggias for tbdr iDsishlfill com­
menJs on earlier ciJafts of Ibis Anicle. TbaDI:s also to Lcoh ll:lbc:ock, Uni\-.rsity of ~\blue School of 
Law, Class of2000, for her excellent J<Search assistmcc, and to Hc:~tber Sc:ISOIIwcin and Ko\'illl Lee 
Rincban, University of ~\blue School of Law, Class of 2001, for nssistance in lhe flllill SlaSCS of lhe 
preparation ofIbis Amcle. 
I. I GRANT GILMORE, SEcu!UTY IN!EREs1S IN PERsoNAL PROPERTY 288 (1965). 
2 David Conner, ConMr's Unfamiliar Quo/Qiiotu, QJ bltp://www.b2oct.uCIIp/CDD11l:C121 
~.html (quoting J. Alton Templin on the OWcednni:m Formub, which c!=ibcs lhe nature of 
Cbristas heinghoth "fuuly God and fuUyman") (last visiiCdScpL 25, 2000). 
3. In this Amcle, Amcle 9 oflhe UDifonn Commercllll Code (U.C.C.) as curmotly enoctod wiD be 
refened to as ~Amcle 9" (unmodified) or "Cmm!t Amcle 9." and specific Code provisions as ~-8·• 
"Section 9-102" or "Cmm!t Section 9-102." The version of Amcle 9 as npproval hY tbe Nndnnnl 
Confercuce ofCommissionCIS ofUnifonn Slate Law (NCCUSL) and lhe Am<ri= Law Institute (ALl) 
on July 30, 1998 wiD be refared to as "Revised Amelc 9" or lhe "Revised Coc!c.• nod sp<cilic Code 
provisions as '-8·· "Revised Secdon 9-102" 
4. Lonisiatut was the filial holdout Slate, adopting lhe 1972 version or Amcle 9 of lhe U.C.C. in 
1988. Act effocdve Ian. I. 1990, No. 528, 1988la. Acts 1367· 422 (oodi6cd nl 1..\. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 10:9-101 to9-60S CWcstl993)). 
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Since its enactment in 1950,5 Article 9 has institutionalized the system 
of secured credit6 During the years since Article 9 was first introduced, 
the types of collateral involved in secured transactions have expanded, and 
through revisions and fine tuning, Article 9 has sought to keep up with and 
facilitate the commercial credit markets.7 It has further tried to strike a fair 
balance between the interests and rights of debtors, secured creditors and 
unsecured creditors. 
The recent Article 9 revision and the particular sections of the bills 
crafted to amend the Bankruptcy Code introduced in two consecutive Con­
gressional sessions and passed in the House and Senate during the 106th 
Congress8 will, ifenacted into law,9 have a significant effect upon secured 
credit transactions, as well as on the financial innovation known as asset 
securitization. Asset securitization is a process whereby assets are sold to a 
buyer, transformed into securities and resold to investors in the public and 
private markets.10 
The Article 9 changes address two fundamental issues relevant to secu­
ritization transaction participants: (i) the characterization of the asset trans­
fer and ('li) the clarity and certainty of the process taken to perfect the trans­
feree's interest in the assets. These changes will eliminate some of the 
uncertainty that asset-backed security investors and securitization origina­
tors face. What the Article 9 changes will also do, however, when read in 
conjunction with the recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, will be to 
allow certain financial market participants to avoid participation in the 
bankruptcy process, notwithstanding their provision of financing to a 
debtor in bankruptcy. A consequence of these changes is the unwitting 
abandonment of two socially desirable objectives inherent in the bank­
ruptcy process: (i) the reorganization of potentially viable businesses and 
(ii) the equality of distribution of a debtor's assets among creditors. Ac­
cordingly, securitization under the combined Revised Article 9/Amended 
Bankruptcy scheme may become the most effective judgment proofing 
5. The proc:ess of draftillg a uniform code govcming secured credit lraDSaclions began In 1946. 
By 1950,the basic consttuct ofArticle 9 was complele. GILMORE, supra note I, at289 n.l. 
6. See Robert B. Scali, 171e Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1791-99 (1994). 
1. The Pemwlmt Editorial Boanl for the Uniform Commcn:ial Code eslnbUsbed a commlucc to 
assess the cffecliveness of Article 9 in 1967. The work of Ibis commiltu was rellccted In lhc 1m 
Official Texl of Article 9. See PBB SruoY GROUP, PERMANENT Eoll'ORIAL BD. FOR nm U.C.C. 
ARno.E9 (Dec. I, 1992) (hmiu.aftcr PBB STuDY GROUP]. 
8. S. 625; 106th Coog. § 903 (2000); H.R. 833, 106111 Cong. § 1012 (1999). 
9. On November I, the Scnale defeated a clollln: petition oo the Banktupley Bill, then:by mini· 
mizing lhc cbances thatlhc bill would be passed Io Ibis Congressional session. Scnale Majorily Lcodcr 
lfcnl Lott said, bowcver, that lhc bill would be n:surm:ted, aad that then: would be "another vole 
befOJe lhc year is onL" ABI World, Banlaupley Headlines, at <bttp~/www.ablworld. 
orglheadlines/OOnovl.blllll> (last visited Nov. 2, 2000). 
10. These lraDSacdons bavc aan'bules ofbolh ttadidnnal debt security lssllances BOd sccun:d credit 
lraDSaedons. Su ge11<rally SECIJRil'IZAUON OF FINANCIAL AssETs (Jason H.P. Kmvill ed., 2d ed. 
1997 & Supp. 2000) (descnlriag sccurilizadoa as a method offmBDCC). 
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mechanism for those debtors able to take advantage of it.11 
Unfortunately, the impact of such a mechanism will be felt not merely 
by the parties consenting to the securitization transaction, but by all the 
participants in the credit markets, as well as all those affected by a securi­
tizing firm's business. The Bankruptcy Code amendments affirmatively 
carve out from the definition of the debtor's estate certain securitized as­
sets, notwithstanding the circumstances surrounding their transfer, which 
will result in fewer assets available for distribution to a bankrupt finn's 
other creditors. The significance and substantive importance of the defini­
tion of what assets are included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate to the 
commercial markets cannot be overstated. 
Moreover, the Article 9 revisions and the proposed revisions to the 
Bankruptcy Code fail to address the normative issues raised by the further 
proliferation of securitization as a method of finance. Securitization, even 
in the absence of bankruptcy, has significant economic and distributive 
effects-not only upon the parties to the transactions, but also upon an 
originator's shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. The concerns 
of these parties are important and should have been considered more care­
fully by the drafters. 
While the changes to Revised Article 9 affecting securitization likely 
met the drafters' objectives of increasing the efficiency of securitization 
transactions through the elimination of transaction costs that are an out­
growth of an uncertain legal regime, the nonnative issues raised by the 
explosion in the use of securitization were not adequately considered. 
Moreover, the proposed change in the Bankruptcy Code granting a super­
priority ofpayment to an exclusive class of asset-backed security investors 
will have significant negative effects upon a bankrupt debtor's unsecured 
creditors. 
Part ll of this Article discusses the origins and history of Article 9. 
Part mdefines and explains securitization and the legal and structural risks 
to which securitization participants are subject Part IV examines Revised 
Article 9's provisions affecting securitization and their potential impact. 
Part V then looks at the proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code and the 
impact of these changes on the securitizing debtor and its creditors. Part 
VI outlines and examines the normative effects these legislative revisions 
will have upon the debtor, as well as upon participants in the market for 
secured and unsecured credit Part VI also argues that securitization has 
II. See LYDD M. LoPucki. The Dealh of liablliiy. 106 YAU W. I. 23-31 (19!16) ~ 
LoPucki. Dealh ofliabiUry) (distingul5hiDg between securiliz:l6on as a flll:IIIciJig method lllld securiti­
zation as a suategy for judgment proofing); see also L)'IID M. LoPucld. 17re Eut111iDl St1U£1Uir of 
Judgmelll Proofing. 51 STAN. L. REv. 147, 149 (1998) [hl:ldt>3ftcr LoPucld. The Euenlilli Stnltlllrr) 
(discussing the issue ofjudgment proofing as baYing a "single essential slnlctun="); Lynn M. LoPuciQ. 
The l=futable Logic ofJudgmelll Proofing: A Rq>ly to Professor ~lm·tut:z. 52 STAN. L. REv. SS 
(199!1) [bereinaftcr l.oPilcld, The lrufotDble Logic) (cliscussing fiulher the issue ofjudgment prooflDg). 
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profound third party effects that policy makers should take into considera­
tion. This Article concludes that such significant and far-reaching changes 
to Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code are premature, as there must be fur­
ther judicial consideration of securitization transactions, both in and out­
side of the bankruptcy context, before provisions with such potentially 
extreme implications are enacted. 
II. .ARTICLE 9'S ORIGIN AND HISTORY 
Prior to the enactment of Article 9,12 lenders used a variety of security 
devices to secure the repayment of borrowed money with collateral. 13 For 
example, the contours of what constituted, and what types of collateral 
were subject to, a pledge, a chattel mortgage and a conditional sale were 
defined by both the common law and a variety of state statutes. 14 Different 
consequences followed from characterizing a financing transaction as one 
12. Between 1952 to I%7, every stale legislature adopted Article 9, except Louisiana. PEB STIJDY 
GROUP,supranote7, at I. 
!3. The initial adopdon of Article 9 was accompanied by the corresponding n:peal of, inter alia, the 
Uniform Condidonai Sales Act, Cbnttel Mortgage Ac~ Fa-'s Lien ~ Uniform Trust Receipts Act 
and AssigDIJiellt of Accounts Receivable AcL See OSCAR SPIVAK, SECURED 'l"RANSAcnONS I (2d ed. 
1%3) (predicting this repeal); see also JAMES J. Wlll11l &. RoBEin" S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COM· 
MERCIAI. CoDE § 21-1, at 714-16 (4th ed. 1995) (discussing Article 9's substitution of these devices 
with one device and one set of tenns). 
14. The following example was cited by Oscar Spivak in his 1963 bandbook on secured tmnsac­
tious prepared under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Bducntioo of tbc Amcri· 
can Law Institute and the American Bar Association: 
For example, in a pre-Code Stat<: teday, suppose the same ~er were to apply at 
his bank for a secured loan to enable him (I) to pun:hase a new delivery truck for his busi· 
ness, (2) to iostall a new piece of equipment in his plaa~ (3) to purchase a quantity of mw 
materials abroad for processing into finisbed goods at his plaat and (4) to meet payroll nod 
operating costs during tbc manufacturing scasoo 'Mien income from sales arc low. Faced 
with sucb an application, the bank would view the clroumstances as requiriDB four separate 
transactions: 
(I) The pun:hase of the motor vehicle might be accomplished by the bank's discount 
or pun:hase of a conditional sales contract betweeo the bom>wcr nod the seller of the truck. 
(2) The equipmeot might be porchased by the bonower with funds advanced by the 
bank in excbange for a cbattel mortgage on the equipment 
(3) The raw material acquisition might require the use ofa letter of credit nod trust "'" 
eelpt transaction wbereby the bank pays the foreign seller and permits the borrower usc of 
the nw materials for the process ofmanufacture in exchange for trust receipts. 
(4) The payroll and operating expeose problems might be met by funds advanced un· 
der a factor's lien device whicb includes a geaeral type of lieo on the bom>wu's inveototy 
and an assignmeot by the bcnower of his accounts receivable as they are created by open 
credit sales offinisbed goods. 
The flexibility or rigidity with wbicb the bank might accommodate its bom>wcr In the 
foregoiug illustradoo will depend upon the availability in the particular slate of the appro­
priate security device statutes. If the state does not bave a factor's lien act or a trust receipt 
act. the problem will be complicated and reson to expensive DOD•statutory devices such as 
field waroltousiug may be oecessmy. 
SPIVAX, supra note 13, at 4-S. This excerpt remained unebaoged from Spivak's 1960, first edidon 
handbook. See OscAR SPIVAK, SEcuRED 'l"RANSAcnoNs 4-S (lst ed. 1960). 
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type or another!5 Moreover, the common law and statutory provisions 
varied from state to state, infusing chaos, confusion and redundancy into 
multi-state transactions.16 Pre-Article 9 Jaw also had a less concentrated 
focus on the rights of secured creditors as well as on debtor and consumer 
protection}7 The legal regime's primary goal was not to facilitate the ex­
pansion of the commercial economy, and it was criticized by some com­
mercial actors as embodying a per se prejudice against secured financing. 18 
Parties entering into commercial transactions faced considerable uncer­
tainty with respect to the creation of their security arrangement, the effi­
cacy of their priority fosition and the remedies available and enforceable in 
the event of default.1 
As the twentieth century progressed, the commercial economy ex­
panded. Commercial actors increasingly used a wider variety of property 
as collateral to secure loans.20 In addition to tangible personal property 
pledges, inventory and accounts receivable financing became established. 
Moreover, the substantive differences in the legal provisions governing the 
credit transactions differentiated by type of collateral began to blur and 
even disappear.21 For example, by the middle of the century, many states 
failed to distinguish, as a practical matter, between conditionnl snles and 
chattel mortgages.22 The introduction of a uniform law governing all de­
vices intended as security, regardless of their form or former chilr.lcteriza­
tion, was a natural next step in the process toward synthesizing the law of 
secured transactions that had already begun in many states.23 In the words 
of Grant Gilmore, Article 9 served to "record what [had], imperceptibly, 
IS. For example. under lbe common law, there wore inherent dilfm:nccs dcpending on whelber a 
security inten:st was characlerizcd as a pledge or os a morlgage. While mast St:ltcs m:cgniud the 
subsequent perfection of a previously created security interest wilh respect to holh '>1'"' of security 
iDICreSIS. whether or not such a security interest was vulocrable to dcfcot by general acditors. good 
Iiiith purchaseiS or lien creditors often 111med upon the security inten:st's c:bor.lclcrization. MorCD\'Cf, 
prior to die nnificatiOD Of law and equity, debtors IIDd CJCditoiS fOUDd lbe distinction between a pledge 
and a mortgage to ha..., aoother significance. A pledgor had the right to redeem colb!aal from the 
pledgee at law, whereas, in contras~ a morlgagor's right to redeem was found in equity. Thus, if lbe 
creditor conld etrcctively prove himselfa mortgagee, he could defeat the dchlor's action for redemptiDII 
in a comt of law. If lhe action for redemption wore hmught in a coun of equity, the creditor could 
defeat the dchlor's claim by proving himself a pledgee. See Gll1o!ORE, supM note I, nt 6. 
16. SuSPJVAK,supMnote 13,at2. 
17. See id. at-4-6 (discussing exmnpleofpre-Code State). 
18. Seeid. 
19. Seeid. 
20. See Gn.MORE, mpra Dote I, at 289. 
21. Seeid. 
22. See. e.g., Francis M. Bomlick, Codifying 1he lD.w qfCondilioiiiZl Stzlu, 18 COLUM. L. RI;V. 103, 
107 (1918); Gr.mt Gilman: & A1W1 Axelrod, Chtmel Securlzy: 1,57 YAI.EU. SI7,S48 (I!»B), cfled 1n 
Gn.MoRE, supra note I, at 289 n.2. Gilman: cites in his lleatise n number of enriy Llw teVicw articles 
noting tbal, while functionally lhe chaltel mortgage and the condidonal sole ,...... idcnticniDDd couns 
recognized this, many states pe:ISisted in fonnalisticaUy recognizing o distinction. Stt GIL!-lORE. supra 
note l,at289n2. 
23. Seeid.at288. 
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already taken place.'.u 
A further impetus for the development of Article 9 was the idea that 
the unification of the disparate bodies of law creating and governing secu­
rity devices would remove some of the impediments to further prolifemtion 
of collateralized tmnsactions?5 By replacing the haphazard and inconsis­
tent body of state decisions with a uniform statute of broad application, 26 
Article 9 corrected variations in the rights of debtors, creditors and affected 
third parties whose pre-Article 9 rights were dependent upon the charac­
terization of each financing tmnsaction. n 
Current Article 9 reflects the belief that secured credit tmnsnctions 
ought to be facilitated. The Article 9 statutory scheme is a streamlined 
process by which secured credit agreements can be entered into and en­
forced. Moreover, Article 9 makes it easier and less costly to take and per­
fect security interests in a greater number of types of debtor assets.28 Se­
cured creditors are empowered to place security interests on most debtor 
assets through the use of floating lien and after acquired property provi­
sions.29 These features of Article 9 place secured creditors in a uniformly 
superior position with respect to debtor assets, relative to parties extending 
credit on an unsecured basis. 
The theory of secured creditors' supremacy has been reinforced by the 
drafters of Revised Article 9. The revised code reflects the drafters' resis­
tance to a re-examination of the assumptions underlying the secured credit 
system.30 Indeed, by expanding the types of collateral that can be taken ns 
24. /d. 
25. Initially, the dxafting committee thought that the uniform statute governing secured cJCdit 
tronsacdons would actually be an amalgam of ~elated statutes, each addlessing a diffmat type of state 
law security device. The five statute types, based upon the category of collateral inidaUy idcnUfted, 
were: (i) inventury and aooounts receivable, (li) cootract rights or other intangibles, (ill) equlpment, (iv) 
agricultur.!l products and (v) consumer goods. In addition, there wns a separate statute mldlesslng 
pledges, ar possessory security interests. Uldmately. nodng that these different types of collatcrnl hod 
"""" similarities in a transacdonal cootext than diffe~ences, the draflm concludml that one statute, 
dividm! into sepamte pans mldlessing the most compelling issues. wns the simplest and most Jogicnl 
approach. See ld. at 290.92. 
26. See68AAM.JVR. 20Secum1T=ctions § 2 (1993). 
27. See ld. 
28. See U.C.C. § 9-109,3 U.L.A. 47 (West Supp. 2000) [be~einafter U.C.C.) (classifying the types 
uf collateral governed by Article 9). 
29. See ld. § 9-204 (providing far secority interests in after-acquired property and for fuluiC ad­
vaooes). 
30. 	 The PEB Commentary cootained the following explanation of its mission: 
[One could ask) •.. whether Article 9 should limit the types of property that """ be sub­
jected to a security interest ar the extent to which a debtor's property cnn be so encumbered. 
Or one might question whether any perfection step should be necessary to obtain priority 
over judicial fien creditors ar other compedng claimants. Or one might question wru.ther 
security inteJCSts ought to be enforceable at aU. 
Although it is well aware of c;:ballenges to the validity of some b:Wc principles that un.. 
derfie Article 9, the Committee chose uot to nndertake a thorough reexnmiuadon of those 
principles. Nor did the Committee's deliberations IC!Iect strong snpport for making major 
adjustments in the balance that Article 9 now sbikes between secured parties and unsecured 
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security.31 limiting the scope of purchase money security interest32 and 
extending the definition of "proceeds .. that may come within a lender-with­
a-floating-lien's reach.33 the drafters have pe1petuated and enhanced the 
dominance ofthe highly leveraged secured lenders. Each of these changes. 
in the event of a debtor• s bankruptcy. will result in a more limited unen­
cumbered estate available for distribution to the bankrupt debtor's unse­
cured creditors. 34 
In additiun to providing rules for secured lending transactions, Current 
Article 9 includes provisions designed to govern certain aspects of transac­
tions involving sales of accounts and chattel paper.3s In response to the 
increasingly common commercial practice of account and inventory fi­
nancing, the drafters of Current Article 9 included certain sales transactions 
within the statute• s reach. 36 The language of such provisions can be traced 
to the pre-Code accounts receivable statutes,37 which were very broad in 
scope and required the public filing of a sale, assignment and transfer for 
cteditors. But insofar as lhc Commillee"s ~<CUmmcndations would m:Jkc it easier and less 
costly to take and perfect security iatcrcsts, !hey ore Hla:ly to ha>.. lhe effect of improviag 
lhc position of secured panics relative to that of unsecured cteditots •••• The Committee 
believes that any ncccsruy acljustmcots for lhc protcctioo oflhird parties should be nude di· 
tcetly. as by changing Aniclc 9's priority rules or by modifying lbe a>'Didauce powas or 
olher distributional rules of the Baulauplcy Code. and no! iadirectly, as by inc:rcasiag lbe 
difficulty and cxpcosc ofcreating perfected security iatcrcsts. 
PEB S11IDY GROUP, supra note 7. at 8·9 (footnotes omitted); set also James J. White. !York OJUl Play 
in Revising Anic/e 9, 80 VA. L REv. 2089 (1994) (dccbring lhe efficiency ofAniele 9 imle\'0111 10 lhc 
revision process). 
31. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9·102{a)(64) {Proposed Revision 1!198) (C<paoding dcfmilion of "pro­
ceeds"): id. § 9-304 (providing for perfection ofa security intcrcst in deposit ncconnts by control). 
32. "A security iutcrcst is a 'purchase money security iatcrcst' 10 the cottcnt that it is ttla::n or re­
tained by lhe seDer of lbe collatera110 secure all or p:ut of its price." U.C.C. § 9·107(a) (Supp. 2000) 
(mlemal quotations omiued). A pun:base money security interest (or PMSI) eao also be ttla::n by n 
1hird party fiuaucier whose fiaancing enables lbe purdtase of collatmL Ste id. § 9-107(b); see also 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(75) (Proposed Revision 1!198) (revisiagCode's dcrmition of"softw:ue"): id. § 9-324 
(providing for purchase money security iatcrcsts ia goods and related software}. Rend togclber, lhe 
section providing for pun:base money security interes~ coupled wilb lhe definition of "software," 
results in a narrow defiaition of lbc types of software in which a p:u1y m:lY tJkc 01 purcbase mo:u;y 
security iatcrcst (only software that is related 10 goods. such as, for example, au item of power equip­
ment contaiaing a computer program for oper.ltiou). 
.33. Set id. § 9-102(a)(64) (Proposed Revision 1!198). 
34. See Robert E. Scott, The TTillh About Stautd F"UUJttcing, 82 CORNEll. I... REv. 1436, 1441-42 
(1997). In lhc event ofbankruptcy, unsecured cteditoTS share inn pro r.lt1 distn"bution of !he dcbto:'s 
assets tb:lt rauaia after secured cteditOIS :ue paid lbc value of lbcir collatcml, and after p:l)11!011t of 
admiaistralive expenses and priority claims. See II U.S.C. § 726 (1994). 
35. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a}{b) (1992). 
36. The origiaal VOISion of Anicle 9 governed lbe sales of "ccntract rights." s.. U.C.C. § 9·106 
(1952). The term "cootract rigllts" was origiDally dcfiaed ia Anie1c 9 as "any right 10 pl)1Dmt under n 
cootract not yet earned by performance and not evideDccd by au instrumeDt ofchattel p:1per." /d.; set 
also GilMORE, supra note I, at 379. This dcfini6oo meant !hot once pcrfomted. some eontr.!tt rights 
became acco!IDts and others became gencml iaemgiblcs. See Gtu.!ORE, supra aOle I, nt 382. As such. 
UDder lhc origiaal VOISioo of Anicle 9, the S!ablte potentially gO\"ctlled the sale Of generaliutaogibl:s. 
See id. 
37. /d. at 308. 
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security of an account. This requirement was implemented to avoid the 
traditional problem of the "secret lien,'.J8 as well as to address a glitch in 
the former Bankruptcy Act that made any unrecorded transfer subject to 
the preference provision.l9 The drafters recognized that the distinction 
between sales and collateral transferred as security was often blurred, and 
accordingly, they chose not to differentiate between the two for purposes of 
Article 9's notice requirement. 40 These transactions are distinguished only 
upon the debtor's default. 
Current Section 9-I02(1)(b) explicitly states that Article 9's provisions 
apply "to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.'"'1 Moreover, Section 9­
302 requires that purchasers of accounts and chattel paper publicly file a 
financing statement, in accordance with Article 9' s procedures, in order to 
perfect their interests in such property. 42 Accounts are currently defined in 
38. See id. at 274-81. Since accounts were commonly used as collateral for Cledi~ as well as sold 
to factOJS for a discount in excbauge for cash. io the absence of a public filing, unscrupulous debtors 
could bolh sell lheir accounts and use lhem as collateral, lhus defeating lhe interests of lhe account 
finaucier. See infra note 47. 
39. Seclion 60 of the Bankruptcy Act provided lha~ for purposes of lhe preference provision, trims· 
fm of property were not perfected until a good failh purchaser could no long<r obtain rights In such 
property superior to the rights of a prior transferee. The common law rule in a number of slates pro­
vided !bat a later recorded assignee could take priority ofa prior unrecorded assignee. See Com Exch. 
Nat'IBonlc v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 435·37 (1943). In Klauder, the Supteme Court held !bat in a oon· 
notificalion accounts receivable financing (where the account debtors are not nolified of the account 
assignment), as between two assignees, priority is granted to the party who first notifies the debtor of 
the assignmcn~ notwithstallding the ,.lative temporal priorities. The Court held that the effect of this 
rule onder Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act was to give the bankruptcy trustee priority oVer any tmns· 
feree ofaccounts that had failed to provide: notificatiou oftheir interests. /d. at 436. 
40. The definilion of "account" in the 1972 Amendments to Article 9 (the first version adopted by 
aU fifty states), however. was narrowed in scope fmm Its original definition. Sales or contnlct rights 
and other general iotangibles were excluded. S.. Dan T. Coenen, Priorities In Accounts: 17re Craty 
QuilrofCurrenr lAw and a Proposalfor Rqorm.45 VAND. L REv. 1061, 1106 (1992):setalso Mor· 
ton M. Scul~ Accounts Receivable Finoncing: Operational Patterns Undtr rhe Uniform Commerr:ial 
Code, II ARiz. L REv. I, 24 (1969) (describing acconnts m:eivable financing prior to lhe enocunent 
of Article 9 and onder the u.c.c.). 
41. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1992): see also id. § 1-201(37) (defining security intcn:st to Include the 
·~nterest ofa buyer ofaccounts •.• suJtiect to Article 9"). 
42. See id. § 9·302. Ifa purchaser of acconnts or chattel paper fails to file-and thus, perfect-In 
accordance with the formalities and procedures outlined in Article 9, its interest is vulnerable to defeat 
by a party with a perfected, and therefore, superior, ioteresL See id. § 9·30l(l)(b). Filing provides 
notice to the public and third parties that the transfened assets are encumbered by another's Iotercst. 
Oocc a creditor's interest is perfected, it is common for a security agreement to provide that DOD• 
payment constibltes an event of default Once a default is declared, the lender is entitled, if she bas 
complied with the aaacbmcnt and perfection formalities of Article 9, to priority over all of the debtot s 
II11Sec1U<Il croditors. as well as priority over subsequentjudgement creditors, secured parties and lien 
croditotll with compeling claims to the same collateral. The most common competitor for such an 
noperfccted transfened ioterest is likely to be the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. Section 544 of lhc 
Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee in banlauptcy all of the rights under slate law of a hypothetical 
creditor with a tien on the debtor's property. Se< II U.S.C. § 544 (1994). If the debtor's property ot 
issue bad been pteviously transferred to a third party, § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code grants the trustee 
the right and power to recover such property for the benefit of the debtor's banlauptcy estate. /cl. § 550 
(1994). Once this property is recoVCJOd, it is included in the debtor's estate and is avnilablc for pro rota 
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Article 9 as "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services 
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether 
or not it has been earned by performance.',.3 Read together, § 544 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and Section 9-30l(l)(b) of the U.C.C. grant the bank­
ruptcy trustee priority in the unperfected transferred accounts.44 
Given both their value and ready liquidity, accounts have regularly 
been pledged as collateral for secured loans.45 Moreover, since well before 
the enactment of the U.C.C., debtors have engaged in sales of their ac­
counts as a means offinancing their business operations.46 The early pur­
chasers of accounts were known as factors, and the transaction character­
ized as factoring.47 
distribution to !be UIISOdliCd credi1ms. U.C.C. § 9-JOI{I)(b) pmvidcs: "{I) Excepti!S olhm;lsc pro­
vided in subsection {2), an unpcrfeclcd security inten:st Is subordirull: to lhe rights of••• {b) ap.,.n 
who becomes alionaeditor beforelhe sccurily int=cstlspcrfceled ••••" U.C.C. § 9-301{1)(b) {1992). 
43. U.C.C. § 9-106 {1992 &. 2000 SIIJ!p.). Olaacl paper Is defined as "a writing or writings which 
evidence both a monelm)' obUgalion and a sccurily inten:st In or a lcasc ofspccUie goods." ld. § 9­
105(1)(b). 
44. See 11 U.S.C. § S44 {1994); U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-502(1) (1992 & 2000 Supp.); w: GbD 
WHnE&SlJMMERS,.n(pranotc 13, §§ 22·1to22-14 {ouUinlng lhepro<Cdun: for !he Cl<llllon, perfec­
tion and enforcement ofArticle 9 intorcsls). 
45. Account financing can take tluec basic forms. See JoHN F. DoLAN, CoMMERaAL LAw 
EssElmALTERMsANDTRANsAcnoNS 146 {2d ed.l997). Flm, b=se ltlscomrnonfor z:ccountsto 
be !be borrower's most valuable asset, lccde!s of wolidag capIIIli often lt<(Uite the! busia:sscs pledge 
their accounts as collatcnd fur wolidag capillll loSDS. /d. The aeeounts'llquldity means thc11helccder 
may =cive its IC(J3YD!cat fiom the account procoeds {casb). ld. The second fo:m ofccoountlin!!nclog 
involvcslcndm who arc involved in !be credit evaluation oflhe accounts, as well as thctccount debt· 
ms. /d. These types oflcndm generally bavc an industry-specific focas ond often arc lnvob'ed lo 
m:civing account dchtors' paymcots cfucctly {through, for cxnmplc, !be csiDI>IIshmcnt of n lode-box 
ammgemont). ld. The third fu:m of accounts receivable finnnelng has blstorlcolly bcoo kno"u ns 
&ctoring.Jd. 
46. See GiLMORE, "'!P"' note I, at288-89. 
47. With its origins in the tcxlile industry, fiu:toriog lovolvcs the ln!nsfer of tccounls to n third 
party, at a discount, in oxcbsngc fur fimds. Common to fiu:toriog mrllllllcmcnls, lhe fl!dor pl!ldulscs 
!be accounts, conducts !be account debtor's credit review ond fimclions as the account scrvicer. See 
Scult, Slqml note 40, at 2. These a4Junct services provide fees to fiu:tors. See SUsAN CruCI!Tml &. 
CHARLEs fERRIER. UNDERSTANDING FACIORING AND TRADE CRmrr 7-9, 22-26 (1986). In sltu:lllons 
wbcre the accounts are sold wilh the understanding that Ifthe account debtor docs not p:lY Its llCCOIIDt lo 
full to lhe d:trimcnt of!be &ctor,lhc bo110wcr will reimburse !be fiu:tor for !!DY losses, md there arc 
olher indiciaofmained owncrsbip, under cuncnt law, thetmnsnclion Is mo~ likely to b: ~
as a loan. Such a transi!01ion is knowo as RCOWSC linnncing. u; bOWC\'er, !be ccoounts are tronsfcned 
to the third party, together wilh !be risk of DDJ>i>3l'tllcnl, then courts hove mo~ oflcn deemed this 
tranSfer a true sale. See Mlgor's Fumituno Mart v. Castle Clodit Corp, 602 F.2d S38, 542-44 (3d C'tr. 
1979) {noting the! the absence ofRCOwsc to the debtor Is one ofscvernl rciCVIlllt futtors lo ddamlolog 
the exlstcuce ofa true sale). See genemlly Rebert D. Aicher & WWIII!It J. Fclletboll; O.aradtrl:Jz/IDn 
ofa Tranifer oflluU.'tlhles cu a Sale or n Secured Loan upon Banlnlptey oftr.J: Thwfemr, 6S A!.L 
BANKR. U.ISI, 182-84 {1991) {statinglbatabanlauptt.y cowtmust considerthe conlcx! oflhelr!!DS­
fer to detc:mine whclher a tranSfer is a sale or loaD); Coenen, "'!P"' note 40, at 1066-67 (discussing the 
emergence and development of fiu:torlng); Thomas E. Plank, '!he True Sole ofL«w ar.d tr.e RD2 qf 
Recmu.re, 14 Gm. MAsoN L. REV. 287, 290 {1991) {observing the! there Is no ono uob'CIStl! crilcrln 
fur the detemlination of a transfer's sale or ID:lll sllllus); Peter L. Mnnclnl, Noll; Ban!avplcy tmd tl-.1: 
UCC cu Applied ID Securitlztztlon: Chanzt:lettrlng a Mortgage Loan Tralrifu as a Sole or a Seaur:d 
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A cousin of factoring, albeit a more fonnidable one in tenns of trans­
action numbers and dollar volume, is the financial innovation known as 
securitization.48 First introduced to the market in the fonn of mortgage­
backed securities over thirty years ago,49 clever investment bankers real­
ized in the mid-1980s that the same financial innovation could be applied 
to non-real estate related receivables.50 Once discovered, the securitization 
market grew quickly, and currently, it is the fastest growing segment ofthe 
capital markets.51 More than $2.5 trillion of asset-backed securities are 
o'utstanding,52 and over the past fifteen years, the market has grown at a 
rate ofthirty percent per year.53 Industry experts have observed that virtu­
ally any asset with an income stream can be securitized," and recent years 
have seen a volume of$150 billion in issuances.55 An estimated $700 mil-
Loan, 73 B.U.L. REv. 873, 877-1!2 (1993) (noting the absence ofguidelines in the U.C.C.Ibrresolving 
the sale verse loau Issue). 
48. See generally Lois R. Lupica, Asset SeCJirlllzatlon: 77re Unsecurwl Cml/ttn-'s PerspectlwJ, 16 
'll!X. L. REv. S9S (1998) (dcscnoing securitization and its risks). Securitization has been rcfom:d to In 
an article by Professor S~cn L. Schwan:z as "alchemy." S~cn L. Schwan:z, 77re Alchemy qfAl#l 
SecurilizaJion, I STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 134 (1994~ Credit securitization, also known as "struc­
tured finance," has further been defined as a "stucturcd J>IOCCSS whereby loans and other JOccivabies .,. 
packaged, undcrwritt:n, and sold in tho form of securities.• JAMES A. ROSENmAL & JUAN M. 
OcAMPo, SECURI'IIZAnON OF CRI!Drr: INSIDE 111E NEW "nlcHNoLOOY OF FINANCE 3 (1988). See 
genenzlly I TAMAR. fRANI:EL, Sl!CURlTlZATION: SnwCIUIW> FINANCING, FINANCIAL AssET POOLS, 
AND AssET BACKED SECURmES (1991 & Supp. 2000) (describing structured financing, flnanciol asset 
pools and asset-backed securities); 1lm GLOBAL ASSET BACKED SECUlUTII!S MAlUCBT: StiiUCTURING, 
MANAGING AND ALLOCAnNG RISK (Charles Stone ct al. cds. 1993) (describing the structure, manage­
ment and risks of assct-backccl securities); 1lm HANDBOOK OF AssET-BACKED SECIJIU11ES (Jess 
Lederman cd. 1990) (describing securitization and assct·backcd securities). 
49. Mortgages (homeowners' obligations to repay the loau used to pUJOhase their home, coupled 
with a security inten:st in the ..at estafl:) .,. sold in pools to intennediaries, who sell them as securiUos 
to the public ll1lllkct. See generally WILLiAM W. BARTLEIT, MORTOAGE·BACKED SECURITIES! 
PR.ooucrs, ANALYSIS, TIW:>ING 54-79 (1989) (describing mortgage-backed securities pn!ducts, anoly­
sls and trading). 
SO. The first securitization transaction was originalcd by the Spcny CcJpOmUon In 1985, 
Bcmedcttc Minton, TIDI Oplcr ct al., Asset Securlllzalion Among Industrial Flmu, at 
hUp://www.timoplcr.com/oplerlabsabs.htm (last visited Sept 25, 2000), at3. Gcnml Motom Acccpo 
tancc CcJpOmUon followed Spcny with a $4 bUiion new Issue in October 1986. Lowell L. Dl}'ml, 
StructundSecuritized Credit: A Superior Technologyfor Lending, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Fall 1988, at 
10-11. 
Sl. See Minton ct al, supnz note SO, at 3. See abo Have Assets, Will SeCUT/1/ze, TIU!AsURY 
MANAGER's REF., July 7, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6849505 ("Unheard of a decade ago, ABS 
cmCJECd in the mid-19805 and now bavc become a familiar, almost humdrum fonn offinance ••• •'"). 
S2. Gaty Sllverman ct at., A $2.5 Trillion Mar/ret You Hardly Know, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 
122 ("According to Leon T. Kendall, a finance pn~fcssor 81 Norlhwcstcm University: 'Securitization is 
one of the most important and abiding Innovations to emerge in the financial mario:ts since tho 
1930s.'j. 
53. See Minton ct al., .supnz noll: SO, 812. 
S4. Suzanne Woolley & Stan Clock, You Can Securitize YirlliDI/y Ever;ything, Bus. WK., July 20, 
1992,8178. 
SS. SeelGm Clark, On the Frontlcr ofCI'tllllve Fi71tmJ:e; How Wall Street Can Securitize Anything, 
FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997, 81 SO; see abo Ron Feldmln, Will the Securitization RJ:volutltm Sp,..ad?, at 
bUp:/lwoodrow.mpls.fi:b.fed.us/pubs/rcgionlrcg959b.html (discussing small business loan sccurtizalion) 
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lion in public asset-backed securities are now issued in an average business 
day.56 
lli. SECURITIZATION AND ARTICLE 9 
Securitization is, in essence, a method of financing that involves the 
sale of assets with an underging payment stream, and the assets' ~pack­
aging and sale as securities. The assets are sold by an originatox"" to a 
special pwpose corporation (SPC),59 and interests in these packages, 
backed by the assets' payment stream, are then sold to investors entitling 
them to some or all of the assets' repayments. 60 Revised Article 9 includes 
myriad provisions designed to facilitate securitization61 in an attempt to 
(last visited June 25, 1999); Lupica. supra note 48, at 602-03 no.25·30 (describing rcpresent>tive OX· 
amples of the amlY of exotic asset categories c:urrenUy being securitized). Stt, t.g., Mich:!cl GrtJ:OI)', 
S.G. Cowen Brings Fine Rights Deal, ASsET SAU!S Rl!P., Mar. 13, 2000 (describing the fir.st securiti· 
zation of a spans stadium naming rights contr.IC!); Adatn Reineboch, As Franthlse lDtm Industry 
EJrpands, Securitivztion Deals are Following: Pool ofReceit:ables May Widen To lnelude Go/ICoune, 
Mavie 11leDlns, INVESJ7>tENT DEALERS' DIG., May II, 1!198, at 13 (l'ortclsling li:mchise asset cbss 
wiD sigaificanlly expand in the next years): Adatn Reineb3cb, The OullookforABS uso Rosy That It's 
Scary: New Asset Categories, New Pltzyers, New Regions are Prolifmlling, L"'VESJ?.IE!oT llEALERs' 
DIG., June I, 1!198. at 26 (deseribing the sccuritizalion of inteUOCIUOJ propeny fulwes, ulilily looses, 
reinsur.ma:risk): Matthew Scbifrin &. Howard RuduiiSky, Rxfor Recri>'tlbles, FORBES, May 6, 1996, at 
52 (describing a scbeme for securitizing pbannaceutieal n:ccivables). 
56. Minton et al, supra note50, at 3: see also Adatn Reineboeb, Once A&a/n, ABS Marut P=·u It 
Can Shake Ojf1Tuo01S, Bad News: Both Resiliency and Cnotivity Came in Handy in a Ruord First 
llJzlf, iNVESrMENT DEALERS' DIG. July 6, 1!198, at 21 (cbar.ll:terizing the securitization m:ul:et ns 
resilient). 
57. This Asticle wiD assWDC the foUowing prototype: the origiaotor is a CO!pOr.llion, its securitiud 
assets are a form ofreceivables and the special pwpose COtpOratiao (SPC) is a COiJIOIO!e sulr.idiluy of 
the originator, furmed exclusively far the purpose ofpurchasiog the origiaolar's n:cci\'Obles and issuing 
asset-backed sccwiries. 
58. The firm originally owaing and selling the nssets is a fiaoneing·seeking firm and is lderrtcl to 
as tbc ..originator." 
59. The asset purchaser Is a SPC created by the originator for the pwpo-..c or purchJsiug the origi· 
uator's assets and issuing securities backed by these nssets' p>ymeut stream. The securities offertcl to 
inves!Ols are merrtcl to as asset·backed securities (ABS). A fitm most commonly originates securili· 
zation transactions ifit bas eamingsin thefonn of cash Dow from l011g term obligations owed to it by n 
debtor. This cash Dow must be unencumbered by any other party's interests. See Lowell L 81)'011. 
Introduction, in 'IliE AssET SEcuRmzA110N HANDBOOK 34 (Phillip 1. Zwcig eel. 1989) (desaibing 
typical secmitiz:atiou nansaclion structures). It is possible. bO\'lC\"tr, to securitize C\'tD illiquid assets. 
See Joseph C. Sbeoker & Anthony J. CoUeua, Asset Securiti:.tuion: Evalutitm, Cumnr lssuu and Nm 
Frontier:.. 691'Ex. L. REv. 1369, 1380 (1991) (describing the variely ofilliqwd asseJS that ase ripe far 
sccuritizlliOll). 
60. See generally RoSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra no!t48 (describing stmeturtd fllll!llcing. \\ilen:by 
loans and other n:ccivables are packaged, underwritten and sold iD the form of securities). Professor 
Tamar FnUikeJ, in her treatise. broadly defines "securitization" as the transfotm:ltioa of an asset into 
securities. s~e I FJ:t.AN~supranotc48,ar4-S. 
61. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9·102(a)(2) (Proposed Revision 1!198) (expanding the deflllition of "al:· 
counts"); id. § 9-!02(a)(64) (expanding the definition of "procoecls"); id. § 9·109(n)(3) (oppl)iug Re· 
vised Asticle 9 to the sale of notes and p3.)'1Dmt intmgibles): id. § 9·309 (ptoviding that ao filing is 
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catch up with a market for asset-backed securities that has developed with 
astonishing speed. 62 These provisions in Revised Article 9 are in response 
to Current Article 9's inability to address the full range of securitization 
transaction participants' legal concerns with any degree ofcertainty. 
A. Securitization 
One of the central reasons firms securitize their assets, in lieu of offer­
ing them as collateral for secured loans, is because they conclude, on bal­
ance, that securitization's net benefits to them exceed the benefits of possi­
ble financing alternatives. 63 These benefits, from the perspective of the 
originator, may include improved liquidity, increased diversification of 
funding sources, a lower effective interest rate, improved risk management 
and accounting-related advantages.64 
Because of the distensive structure of securitization transactions, origi­
nators, as compared to debtors collateralizing secured loans, are better able 
to offer their financiers a more limited exposure to risks associated with the 
required to perl"ect an interest in the sale of a payment intangible); id. §§ 9-406, 408 (enhancing tho 
assjgnabifity ofaccounts, general intangibles and promissory notes). 
62. 1bis is true in spite of the fact that the development of the law governing the issuance of these 
ABS bas not kept pace with the level of market activity. In addition to the law governing COill!lll:l1:lal 
transactions, ABS implicate a variety of other areas of the law. For example, the issue of whether 
inte=ts in asset·pools are "securities" under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities llx<:hange 
Act of 1934 is currently under debate. See 2 FRANKEL. supra note 48, at 4-9, 53-54. Set also Park 
McGioty, Whaz is a Security?, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1993) (discussiog the issue of ABS 
classification as securities). 
63. Traditiooal secur<d financing can be vel}' costly if a finn bas n large quantity of debt oo its 
books, little or no floanciog track record or financial history or is lacking an exposnre to a brood base of 
investors. Moreover. it is estimated that the cost ofborrowing funds &om a typical regulnted fiDDnclnl 
institution must include the cost of required reserves, FDIC insurance. equity costs, IDilD loss reserves 
and openuing costs. See Lowell L. Bl}'an, Conclusion to THE ASsET SECUIUTIZAnON HANDBOOK, 
supra note 60, at 549; see also Harold H. Goldberg et al., Asset Secun'tit.lltion and Corporate Financial 
Health, J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN•• Fall 1988, at 45, SO (discussiog the credit impact orasset securiUza· 
tioa on the originator ofa loan); I SEC\JltriiZAnON OP FINANCIAL J\SSErS, supra note 10, § 1.01. at 1-4 
to 1-7; Meredith S. Jackson. uap of Faith: Ass<t·Bas<d undlng to Asset-Bacud Securltlratlon-A 
Case Study. 2 STAN. J. L Bus. & FIN•• 193 (outlining some of the benefits ofsecuri6za6oo to financing 
seeking firms); Michael Liebowitz, Can CorporrJlt America SeC"Urit/u • • • lt.se!f?, INVi!SNBNT 
DEALERS' DIG., Jan. '1:1. 1992.. at 14 (discussiog securitizatioo as an atttactivc fina.aciug alternative for 
below investment grade compaoies). Tbe point must be made. bowovcr, that there may be sbDn·term 
benefits flowing fmm a finn's decision to securitiu its assets. but long·term adverse consequences. 
See Infra pp. 235-40. 
64. ROSENll!AL & OcAMPO. supra note 48, at 6-12. Further, finns may securidze their assets due 
to the influence of professional advisors who stand to benefit financiaDy from an incrensing number of 
securidzations. See Lupica. supra note 48. at 606 & n.48 (desctibing securitization's transaction costs 
and the pames, including attorneys, invesanent bankers, rating agencies and aceounlanls, who fman· 
cinDy benefit from a proliferation of these transactions): Geoffrey Richards, Services: Securlt/:aJion /J 
a Boonfor Valuation Firms. ar b!lp:llwww.meion6ne.com/pnbslorei/98jaol me980lp.btml (last visited 
June 24, 1999) (desctibiog bow securitization has increased the business or asset appmisers and bas 
required assessments of the durability of income streams). These benefits, to the extent they ""' pres· 
ent may be counterbalaoccd by some very sigoificant costs. See illfra pp. 236-40. 
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originating fum as a whole.65 These risks include exposure to external 
events, business downturns, interest rate fluctuations, management deci­
sions and the potential for the originator's insolvency or bankruptcy-the 
risks that are of greatest concern to secured creditors.66 In contrast, securi­
tized asset investors are concerned 'with two central issues: (i) the character 
and quality of the payment stream of their investment's underlying assets 
and (ii) the efficacy of the transaction's structure. 
Built into every asset securitization transaction are risk containment 
measures that have as their primary focus the quality of the underlying 
assets.67 For example, to obtain a credit rating in the public markets that 
enables their sale, asset-backed securities are most often accompanied by 
some form of credit enhancement. 68 Typical credit enhancement devices 
include letters of credit, private insurance or third party guarantees.69 This 
credit enhancement is a form of insurance that guarantees, in whole or in 
part, that payment will be made to ABS investors as the securities come 
due.70 In the eveut of an underlying asset payment delay or shortfall, the 
SPC draws upon the credit enhancement and investors are paid from this 
draw.71 Thus, notwithstanding a fum's lack of a financing track record, its 
poor credit rating or debt overload, 72 there will likely be a market for the 
65. See Nicholas Millanl, The Management and Transf<r of Crtdi~ Uquidily and Contingency 
Risks, in Tim GLoBAL ASsET BACKED SEcuRmES MAA1<£r: STRUCTIJiliNG, MANAGING AND 
AI.Loci\11NG RisK, supra note 48, atl27-33. 
66. Secuml c:reditOis first look to the geneml c:mlit of the debiOr for rtp3ymenL As a P•>=t­
enfon:ement device, secured c:mlitms identify collateml lhnL upon debtor's defauiL Is nvnibble to 
satisfy the debtor's obligation. See generaJiy LYNN l\1. LDPuCKJ & EuzABEIH WA!tREN, SEcURED 
CRmrr: A SYS1EMS APPROAOI (2d ed. 1!198) (outlining the proccdwes by v.illcb secured c:mlitOJS 
seek rtpnyment ofa lo:m after the debtor bas defaulted). 1be debtor's baslauptcy m:1y bo.vc the cffeeL 
however, of altering secured c:mlitms' priorities in collateml nnd dilutiag the value of secured c:mli­
tms' interests. See II U.S.C § 363(b)(l) (1!194) (allowing theiiUSieC to usc. sell or lease property of 
the estate, including property oncumbercd by a security interest): /d. § 364(c) (authtnizillg the debtor to 
bmrow money, post-petition, on a SCCUJOd b3sisJ: /d. § 364(d) (authorizing lhc debiOr to bamlw mcacy 
SCCUJOd by ascaior or equal lien on property with nn Cllistiag sccurity Interest nlll!cbed). 
fiT. See StaDdanl & Poor's, at http:l/www.st:md:udandpoors.com/r.llinssfstruc:tlll<dllnnnccl in­
dex.b!m (last visited ScpL 29, 2000): see also William 1. Curtin & Stephen H. Dectorr, Asstr·&:rkd. 
Securilies: An Artnu:rive AtldiriDn ro the Low-Dumtion Seaor of the F'uced lnro= Marlzr, In Tim 
HANDBOOK OF ASsET-BACKED SECURmES. supra note 48, nt203-04 (discussiDg the methods of I03n 
r.uing agencies). 
68. See generaUy Paul 111. Shup:lclc. On BOlliUfmies and Dqinitions: A Comm<II/Diy on Dean 
&rinl, 80VA. L. REV. 27:/3, 2296-97 (1!194) (outliDing the role ofo:rcdlt r.uing ngoncies). 
69. S<eld. 
70. See/d. 
71. See /d. 
72 When a r.uing agoncy rates a traditional cmpcmtc sccurity issuance (mcludicg debt securities), 
the :linaDciaJ condition and perfonu:mcc of a corop30y, the quality of m:lnng<ment audits impott upon 
the company's perfonu:mee are all liiCiols that are tlkeD into l!CCOUIII In arriving at n ~ating. See St:m­
danl & Poor's, at hltp:llwww.stmdonlandpOOJS.ccmlr.dingslcorporatcsl'mda.htm (last 'isited Mar. IS, 
2000). 
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asset-backed securities if lbe credit enhancement is of sufficient quality'3 
and lbe asset-backed securities yield a return commensumte wilb lbeir mt­
ing.'4 
The efficacy of lbe tmnsaction' s structure, however, turns in part on 
lbe chamcterization of lbe asset tmnsfer, which in tum determines how lbe 
ABS investors will be affected by lbe originator's bankruptcy. 
Notwilbstanding some market partici~ants' touting of securitization as a 
"bankruptcy proof' melbod of finance, s ABS investors are not entirely and 
definitively removed from lbe effects of !be originator's bankruptcy.76 
If a securitization originator files for bankruptcy, its trustee will care­
fully examine each of lbe originator's tmnsactions in connection wilb lbe 
trustee's duty to enhance the value of !be bankruptcy estate.77 The trustee 
will seek to .defeat lbe claims of any party wilb an interest in any of the 
debtor's potential assets. If a debtor in bankruptcy has securitized a por­
tion of its assets, its trustee will be concerned wilb two issues: (i) lbe nature 
and chamcterization of the asset tmnsfer and (ii) the securitized assets' 
73. The threshold market evaluation is conducted by tbc rating agencies. Ste Shuptack, 3upra note 
68, at2296-97. The mtings supplied by these agencies diclate the price at which the securities will sell 
in the market IWing agencies edopt a "weak link policy" in detcnniniog an ADS rating, mcaalng their 
ratiog will not be higher than the credit rating of the credit enhancement pmvider. Su Curtin &. 
Deckoff.supra note67,at203-04. 
74. But see Frederick Danaen. The Failed Promise of As!et·Bacl:Ed Securities. INS1TJUTtONAL 
INVI!SI'OR, OcL 1989. at261 (observing that market prices for ABS bave not always been an accurate 
roOection or their credit-enhanced quality); Silverman. supra note 52 (observiog that there is an "iUu· 
sioo of liquidity" in the ADS marlcet which is leadiog to moro expensive erodit for originators, who In 
rum aro passing the higher costs on to consumers); Gary Silverman, Commtntary: Securitization is No 
S.curily Bltlnht, Bus. WK., OeL 26, 1998, at 140 (noting that banks a.. securitizing safe loaos, and 
keeping the risky ones. thereby maskiog their true insolvency probability); Suzanne WooUey, What's 
Nut. Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Rislc Can Be Securitiud-But Quality May Be Iffy, BUS. WK., Sept. 2, 
1996, at64 (quoting a rnting ageocy maoaging di=tor urging caution to ADS investors). 
75. Commentators touting securitization's beoelits bavc regularly referred to these transactions ns 
"bankruptcy-proof." S<e, e.g., Sn!VEN 1.. SCHWARCZ. STJIUC'TUlli!J) FINANCE: A GUIDE TO T11B 
I'RINCIPLI!S oF ASsi!T SEctntmzAnoN 16-36 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing ways that a speclal-pwpose 
vehicle (SPV) cao be made "bankruptcy-romote"); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with lmperftct 
lnformDiion: The Anicle 9 Priority Debates, 82 CORNElL 1.. REv. 1373. 1393 (1997) (recognizing lhllt 
asset secoritization is a tool to "bankruptcy-proof" security interests). 
76. It should be noted that baolauptcy-related risks do not exclusively involve the issue of asset 
transfer and perfection. See genenzl/y In re Kingston Squaro Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (assessing a situation where au SPC became the subject of au iovolunlllly bankruptcy, jeopard· 
izing ADS investors' ioterosts). One highiy publicized case in which a securitization structure col­
lapsed in bankruptcy was the Towers Financial affair. See In re Towers Fin. Corp. Notebolders Utig., 
No. 93 Civ 0810(WKXAJP). 1995 WL571888 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995). In that case, the originator 
and five of its SPCs. which bad issued health-care roceivable backed bonds, filed for bankruptcy wblch 
resulted in substantial losses for the ABS investors. But see In re Federated Dep't Stores·, Inc., No. 1­
90-00130, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 392 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 1992) (rospecting the bankruptcy romote 
structun: of the transaction); In re Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.. No. LA 91-64140 JD, 1991 Bankr. 
LEXIS 2186 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 1991) (rospeeting the bankruptcy remote stractun: of the trans­
action). 
77. See II U.S.C. § S44 (1997) (authoriziDg the trustee to defeat the interost of any unperfected 
creditor, this pmvision is roferred to as the ·~troog arm clause"). 
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classification and the sleps necessary to perfect the transferee's interest in 
the assets. 78 
B. The Asset Transfer 
The determination of whether an asset transfer is a ''true sale" or a se­
cured loan is not governed by a statutory rule; rather, it is an equitable de­
termination made Wthe courts based upon the presence (or absence) of a 
variety of factors. While parties may intend one characlerization, the 
facts and circumstances of the transfer may suggest another. ro The factors 
considered by courts include. inter alia, the presence of a residual inlerest 
to be retained by the ori~ator,81 the sale price set at fair market value by 
independent appraisers, the absence of recourse to the asset seller, 83 the 
78. Id. 
79. See Aicher & FcUcrbof, supra nolc 47, at 182-84: M:mcini, supra DOle 47, at Bn-82: Pbnk, 
supranDic47, at29D. 
BD. See, e.g., In reS.O.A.W. Enters., lac., 32 B.R. 279,283 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1983) (lloldiog that 
participation agreement was a !nan trutsaction because the rate of ICpayment to the jW!icip3tlt was 
greater than that to tba lead lender, while the particip:u>t bore no risk): Boerner v. Colwell Co., m 
P.2d 200,21J4.05,2D8 (Call978) (lloldiug that tr.msaction involving CODSIIUction contracts wos osale 
and not a Joan, even thoogb the c:cntracts were ossigned to a llnancing c:omp311y). Ulustm~ve of tba 
DDcertainty that mgns with respect to this issue is tba common reluc:13t!eo on the p:ut of !:gal ndvisms 
to delinilively c:cncJude in their legal opinion that o specific asset transfer is n true sale. llistoricilly, 
l:go1 advisms would not give opinions with respect to bankruptcy issues because of the cquitlble 
discretion affonled bankruptcy COWlS. As aD lncre:!Sing DtuDber Of Structured fmaneo ttansoctions 
came to market in the 198Ds, rating agencies began to teqUire legol opinions oo cert:tin bankruptcy 
issues that affeclcd their rating process. See genemlly George W. BemJ:lDt. T1u: Role ofrhe Opinion of 
Counsel: A Tenuuive ReevaluaJion, 49 CAL. ST. BJ. 132 (1974) (suggcs~g laW)'CIS' restr.Jint on the 
"urge to demand as much as possible" when drafliag !ego! opinions in busin""' transoctions); Scou 
Htzgibbon & Dooald W. Glazer, Legal Opinions in CJ>rporare Tmnsoctions: T1u: Opinion on Ag,.e· 
mmtsandlnmum<nrs,l2 J. OF CoRP. L. 6S7 (1987) (outlining the meaningud pTOCCSS ofproviding• 
legal opinion in a CO!p0l31c transoction); Robert J. llaJ1er, Jr. & Kameth N. Klee, T1u: Impact ofrhe 
New Bankruptcy Code on the "Bonlauptcy Out" in Legal Opinions, 48 FORDHAM 1.. R£v. 277 (1979) 
(di"'Dssing specificilly legal opinions in the conlcXt ofbonlauptcy): Special Comm. on Legal Opinions 
in Commercia!Transactions, N.Y. County Lawyer.;' Ass'n, Legal Opinions to 17Wrl Ptutiu: An Easier 
Parh, 34 Bus. LAW. J89J (1979) (encouraging the elirttitmtion fmm legal opinions of "llmlliguity, 
uncertainty and stylistic differences of a nonsubst:mth·e nab.lre"). 
81. See, e.g., In re EvagiOCD Valley Resort. 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. 0. Moine 1982) (llolding that 
assignmmt created a security interest because of debtor's retliucd interest); In n Hunicme Elkham 
Coal COJp, 19 B.R. 609 (Ballkr. W.O. Ky. 1982) (holding that ossignment creolcd a security interest 
bocanse of debtm's mainlcDancc ofan interesl): In re Nixon Mach. Co., 6 B.R. 847 (Bankr. B.D. Tcna. 
198D) (lloldiog that debtor's assignment ofsecurity ioterest was a secured ttons:lction to the CltlcDt that 
it agreed to take back any defaulted Dotes when security interest nssigned): ~e abo U.C.C. § 9-SDl 
(Snpp. 2DOO) (dlscussing coUectioo rights ofsecured party). 
82. See, e.g., In re Comet Capital COJp.. 142 B.R. 78 (Bonkr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that assign· 
meat was a loan because of l:nder's con~ued payment of interest to porliciponts, nor..ithstmding 
botrower's defauiQ. 
83. S.e, e.g., Major's Fuminn-e Mart v. Castle Credit COJp., 602 F.2d S38, 542-4d (3d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that trutsaction was a Joan, rather than a sale because of risk retlitted by nssignor ond tba 
presence ofi'CCOUise, eonpled with the conduct of tba jW!ies). Ifthe \":!lue of the coiLlteralis I.,.. than 
the debtor's outstanding obligations to the lender, a lender with =mysue the debtor pessonally 
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acquisition of dominion and control over the assets by the purchaser,84 the 
assumption of the benefits and burdens of ownership by the purchaser's 
and the intent of the parties as evidenced by their writings.86 Many securi· 
tization transactions, however, combine indicia of both a true sale and a 
secured loan, which leaves the ultimate decision up to the court's discre· 
tion.87 
There are clear consequences to the characterization of an asset trans­
fer as a true sale or a secured Joan. Ifan originator transfers an Article 9­
defined account intending to engage in a true sale, Article 9 governs the 
on tbe note, seeking full paymelll. !He ROBERT W. HAMILTON, PllNDAMENTALS OP MODERN 
BUSINESS 9 (1989). 
84. Courts have iJ!enlilied !be following llldilional factors in cletenninins whether a lnlnsfcr ls a 
true sale or secured loan: 
a. 	 whether lite U1liiSfetoe or UUsfm>r bears !be risk !be receivables will be uncoUcctlblo; 
b. 	 wbelher even a !imiled right of recourse is related to account debtor defaults; 
c. 	 wbellter lherc is a right of rodemplian by !be lr.lllsferor; 
d. 	 whether collections on reccivables arc made to lock box accounts: 
e. 	 wbelber valid business RaSODS exist for not 110dfying account debtors of lite account 
trai!Sfm. 
In u Federated Dep't Stores, l'llc., 1990 Bankr. LBXIS 1557 (Bankr. S.D. Ohlo July 26, 1990). 
as. !He, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. soo. 519 (1968), qff'd, 426 P.2d 417 
(6th Cir. 1970) (because seller of insiiDment aCCOUIIIS mained a lllCIISUIO of risk, sucb uansfor was 
r=ognizod as a loan). &e also F'lmlllll's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover, 813 P.2d 266 (9111 Clr. 1987) 
(holding that because lite debtor rctaiDcd a desrce of risk in collllCCtion wllh a lll!Dsfer and the fact 
lhat !be interest rate cbarsed was lied ID prevailing bom>Wins rates, the equities of !be case suascstcd 
a Joan rather than a sale). 
86. !He, e.g., In re Lemons & Assocs., 67 B.R. 198, 2()9.10 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (holding that 
transaction was a sale of notes, not a loan. because of buyers' objective expressions of intent that 
transaction was a loan). 
87. &e, e.g. Bearv. Cohen, 829 F.2d 70S, 707,710 (9lh Cir. 1986) (holding that the 1Jansactlons 
were sales, not loans). Rules p10mulgated by the Flllancial Accounting Standards Board state: 
A tnmsfer offinancial assets (or aU or a portion ofa financial asset) In whlcb the tnmsll:10r 
SU!mlders eontn>l over those finaaclal assets shaU be aeoounted for as a sale to the extent 
that eonsldcllllion other than bcocflclal lntetcsts in tbc lransferrcd asscis is received In ex• 
cbaasc. '!be tnms!Cror has surrendered control over tnmsfcrred assets ifaad only if all of 
tbc followJns conditions arc met: 
a. The lransferrcd assets have been Isolated liom the tnmsfCIOr-put presumable be­
yond tbc reach of!be tnms!Cror and Its creditors, even In bankruptcy or other receiver· 
ship .... 
b. Either (I) eacb tnmsrcrce obtains tbe ~fioe orconditions that constrain It liom 
taking advantage ofthat risht ... --ID pledge or excbaase the tnmsterred assets or (2) 
!be tnmsfcrcc is a qualuying spcclalopwpose entity ••• and the holders ofbencOclal 
interest In that entity have tbo righl-fioe orconditions that constrain them liom Ink· 
ing advaarago ofthat rlsht ...--ID pledsc or excbaasc those Interests. 
c. The =telOr docs not maintain offcclive contn>l over tho tnmsferred assets tbiOugh 
(I) an asrccm1:11t that bollt 1:11tidcs and obligates the tnmsfCIOr to repurchase or redeem 
them bclbrc their malurlty ••• or (2) ""asrccmcnt that endUes the transfc10r to rcpur· 
chase or redeem lransferrcd assets that arc not rcndlly obtainable •••. 
S'I'ATI!MI!NI' OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 125, Aceountins for TlansfCIOm and Servicing 
of F'ntancial Assets and Bxtlnguishments of Liabilities 34 (Pin. Accounlios Standards Bd. 1996). 
However, bankruptcy courts have, at limes, used tbcir eqnitable discretion to conclude lhat, notwlllt­
sranding !be presence of several -.e indicia, an asset lr.lllsfcr ought to be construed wlllt 
coosideralion or lite equities. &e, e.g., In u Lemons & Assoes., 67 B.R. at 209-10. 
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transfer and requires the transferee to file publicly its interest in the account 
in the Article 9 filing records.88 Once filed, and thus perfected, the asset 
transferee's interest in the account is not subject to defeat by any subse­
quent creditor, or to defeat by the trustee. 89 
Similarly, even if, arguendo, the account transfer is deemed to be a 
secured loan, once a proper Article 9 filing is made, the asset transferee, 
upon the originator's bankruptcy, will continue to have an enforceable in­
terest in assets transferred.90 The practical distinction between characteri­
zations, however, is that a secured loan transferee is a "party in interest'' in 
the originator's bankruptcy , 91 and as such it is required to participate in the 
proceedings and is subject to collateral substitution, reduction in priority of 
payment and other alteration of rights.91 In contrast, the perfected true sale 
asset transferee is not required to continue its relationship with its origina­
tor and may take its assets and go home.93 
If, however, the transferee in either a sale or loan transaction fails to 
publicly record its interest in accordance with Article 9's requirements, 
upon the originator's bankruptcy, the transferred assets are su!iiect to rec­
lamation by the trustee for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. The asset 
transferee, notwithstanding its status as a purchaser or creditor, is relegated 
to the ranks of an unsecured creditor of the originator.95 
C. Securitized Assets' Classification and Peifection 
The most significant problem for securitization originators and ABS 
purchasers arises when the transferred asset falls outside of the Current 
Article 9 definition ofaccounts or chattel paper.96 If, for example, the asset 
transferred is a general intangible and the transfer is deemed a collaterali­
zation of a secured loan, the transfer is governed by Article 9. The trans­
feree, once properly filed and perfected, is a fully secured party of the 
originator. In contrast, however, if the transfer of a general intangible is 
deemed a sale, the transfer is not governed by Article 9, but by other law. 
This is a risk to which many of the securitizations currently being brought 
88. See U.C.C. §§ 9-401, 9-402 (Supp. 2000) (describing !be filing ~<quir=eats for ,..,;OilS l)l'CS 
ofcollateral). 
89. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1992j: II U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). 
90. Seeid. 
91. Sedioo 1!09(b) of !be BanlauprcyCode dofines "p3ny in iole«Sl" Joinclude a creditor. Ste II 
u.s.c. § 1109(b) (1994). 
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994). 
93. See United Slates v. WbiliDg Pools, IDe., 462 U.S. 198,204 o.8 (1983) (st!tiag. iD dielllm.lhat 
wben a debtor's esla!e mained minor interest in estlle pmpeny, lbel!biUJy of a IIUslee to ros:Un pos­
sessioa of!be property is not limited). But see David Groy C:ulsoa, 1M Rontn Follllll4timls ofS«uri· 
lilalion, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. JOSS, 1063-64 (1998) (atgltiog lhot, in rdi:!ncc oa ll'hilinc Pools, 
the originator retains an interest in asseiS tr.msfcmd in connection with asec:uritiz::diou). 
94. See 11 U.S.C §§ S44(a), S50(a) (1994). 
95. See ill. 
96. See U.C.C. § 9-102(b) (Supp. 2000). 
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to the market are vulnerable. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Current Article 9 governs, in addition to 
traditional secured credit transactions, the sale of accounts and chattel pa· 
per, numerous securitizations involve the sale of assets that fall outside of 
the Article 9 definition of "accounts." Parties to securitization transactions 
have had to look to non-Article 9 law (federal and state common or statu· 
tory law) to determine their responsibilities and rights. For example, sales 
of various rights to payment, including licensing receivables, are not ex­
plicitly included under the Current Article 9 definition of "accounts."97 
They are, in all likelihood, general intangibles. If an owner of a licensing 
receivable wants to pledge this asset as collateral for a secured loan, the 
lender has to comply with Article 9's formalities for attachment98 and per· 
fection.99 If, however, under current law, the owner of the licensing re­
ceivable wants to sell or securitize this asset, any and all requirements for 
public notification of the sale are found under non-Article 9 state law. 
The purchaser of the interest in the licensing receivable must engage in 
a complicated analysis of a number of issues. The threshold detennination 
involves the nature of the transaction contemplated: is it a sale or a secured 
loan? Notwithstanding the parties' intention, the transfer must meet certain 
objective tests to be deemed a sale!00 Assutning the transferee is satisfied 
that the transfer meets the tests of a sale, then applicable non-Article 9 
statutory and case law must be exatnined to detertnine the steps necessary 
to protect the transferee's interest. Once all the non-Ariticle 9 procedures 
are complied with, the transferee should not be vulnerable to the strong 
arm of the originator's trustee in the event of bankruptcy. 101 
If, however, the transfer is ultimately characterized as a transfer of 
collateral for a loan, notwithstanding the transferee's expressed intent to 
engage in an asset sale, then the assets must be returned to the bankruptcy 
estate upon the transferor's bankruptcy unless an Article 9 fmancing state· 
ment'02 has been filed.103 The transferee is disgorged of what it thought 
were its assets and must wait in line as a general unsecured creditor in the 
97. See U.C.C. § 9·106 (1992 & Supp. 2000). 
98. A security agreement describing the colla<eral would have to be prepared and signed by both 
parties to the transaction, thus crcating a security interest. .In addition. value must have been given nod 
the debtor must have rights in the coUateraJ. See U.C.C. § 9·203(1)(a}(c) (1992 & Supp. 2000). 
99. A financing statement must be filed in the office of the Secrewy of State in the state of tho 
debtor's principal place of business. See U.C.C. § 9-401. See also id. § 9-402 (dcscn"bing the fonn:~J 
~IS of the financingsw.mtnt). 
100. Ste $Upra notes 78·86 for authorities exanUaing tbe sale versus loan dilciiUD11 under common 
Jaw and Anicle 9. 
101. See II U.S.C. § S44 (1994) (cmwnm1ing the types and scope of the powers of the trustee In 
bankruptcy). 
102. See U.C.C. § 9·302 (1992 & Supp. 2000) (outlining when a fillog is required to perfect security 
inten:sts). 
103. See II U.S.C. §§ 547. 550 (1994) (grandog authnrization to bankruptcy trustees to disgorge 
assets of the debtor from the hands of third parties). 
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transferor's bankruptcy proceeding. 104 The drafters of Revised Article 9 
were interested in eliminating this risk and related uncertainty, as well as in 
augmenting the ability of willing originators to securitize a greater number 
of their assets with enhanced certainty and predictability. Accordingly, 
they added numerous provisions in Revised Article 9 that are designed to 
address these issues. 
N. REVISED .ARTICLE 9 AND THE NEW SECURITIZATION SAFE HARBORS 
On April 15, 1998, a revised version of Article 9 was proposed for 
enactment by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State 
Laws and the American Law Institute. 105 According to the drafting com­
mittee,106 the growth and continued innovation of the credit markets since 
the statute's last revision in 1972, coupled with the desire to reconsider 
some of the Code's provisions in light of Article 9 case law and the Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, led to the need for the statute's revision} 07 
One of the issues the drafters sought to address was Current Article 9's 
imperfect application to new types of collateral and innovative financing 
transactions. As stated in the PEB Report, "[b]ecause Article 9 regulates 
important relationships among creditors and purchasers of collateral, un­
certainty concerning its application adds to transaction costs and also can 
result in decreased availability ofcredit "103 Thus, Article 9 has undergone 
the revision process to address ostensibly issues of uncertainty and to 
facilitate further commercial credit and sales transactions, thus having the 
effect of institutionalizing securitization transactions. 
Under Current Article 9, there are safe harbors for parties seeking to 
securitize the sorts of assets that fall under the current definitions of "ac­
counts" and "chattel paper." Parties engaged in the securitization of other 
types ofassets, however, are currently governed not by Article's 9's provi­
sion, but by other law. Tbatlaw may be common law or retnnants of pre­
104. See. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994) (settiug forth Cbapler 7 liquicladon dlslribudon sci!=); id. § 
I 123(a)(!}(4) (1994) (assorting lhal trealmenl of IIDSOCIUOd claims in Cb:lpler II is deltrmincd by 
class). 
!OS. See TilE AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L CoNF. OF CoMM"RS ON UNIJ'. STAlE LAWS, Um!'ORM 
CoMMERCIAL CODE, REVIsED AI<TICU9, SEcuRED "!l<ANSAcnONS (Proposed Revision 1998). 
106. 	 As slaledin the Official Comment 10 ReVisedSecdon 9-101: 

lD !990, the Permanent Editorial Bo:ud for the UCC wilh lhe support of iiS spODSOIS, lhc 

American Law !Dsdtute and lhe Nadonal Conf...,ce of CollllDissioners on UDifonn Sl:lte 

Laws, establisbcd a committee 10 study Anic!e 9 or tbe UCC. The study commiltee issued 

iiS J:eP0r1 as of December I, 1!192, nocommendillg tbe <=ltiOD ora dr:lftins committee for 

tbc =-Won or Anicle 9 and also nocoiiiDlODIIiDg numerous sp<eific c:lllDgcs 10 Anlc1c 9. 

Organized in 1993, a d!afting committee met fifteen times froml99210 1998. This Anic!c 

was approved by i1s spODSotS in 1998. 

U.C.C. § 9-101 official cmt 2 (Supp. 2000). 
107. PEB Sn1DYGROUP,suptDaote7,at2 
108. /d. 
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Code accounts receivable statutes. The following sections describe the 
changes made to Article 9 and their potential impact on securitization 
transactions. 
A. Expanded Definition of "Account" 
Revised Article 9 has redefined the term "account."109 Whereas Cur­
rent Article 9 limits the definition of "account" to a "right to paYi'lent for 
goods sold or leased or for services rendered,''110 Revised Section 9­
1 02( a)(2) reads: 
"[A]ccount" means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, 
whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property that has 
been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned or otherwise dis­
posed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered, (iii) for a 
policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a secondary ob­
ligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy provided or to be 
provided, (vi) for the use or hire ofa vessel under a charter or other 
contract, (vii) arising out ofthe use ofa credit or charge card or in­
formation contained on or for use with the card, or (viii) as win­
nings in a lottery or other game ofchance operated or sponsored by 
a State, governmental unit of a State • . . . The term includes 
health-care-insurance receivable. 111 
The change in this definition is significant because the assets that fall 
under Revised Article 9's expanded definition of "account" are deemed, 
under current law, to be either instruments, general intangibles, accounts or 
non-Article 9 governed property.112 The potential for such a non-uniform 
classification of what, under Current Article 9, may be different pools of 
the same asset makes it difficult to determine the proper method of perfec­
109. See U.C.C. § !1-102(a)(2) (Proposed Revision 1998). 
110. Cum:nt Section 9-106 defines "account" as "any right 10 pii)'II1Cilt for goods sold or loosed or 
for scl)riccs rendmd which is not evldeneed by an lnsttument or cltat!el paper, whether or not It has 
been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1992 & Supp. 2000). 
Ill. U.C.C. § !l-102(a)(2) (Proposed Revision 1998). Revised Section 9-l02(a)(2), definlng "oc­
coun~• funhcr roads: 
Thetenn does not include (i) rights 10 PII)'II1Cilt cvldeneed by cltatlel paper or an instrumen~ 
(ii) commerciaiiOrt claims, (ill) deposit accounts, (lv) Investment property, (v) letter-of­
credit rights or lcttcrs of crcdl~ or (vi) rights 10 payment for money or ftmds advanced or 
sold, other 1han rights arising out of the usc of a mdlt or chill!!• cand or iDfonnntlon con­
tained on or for usc with the cand. · 
ld. 
.112. The proper classificalion often tums on the tenns of the parties' underlying controctuol ar­
nmgcmcnts. See Stephen L. Scplnuclc, Cltmifjolng Cmllt CardRscetvahk• Undsr the U.C.C.: Ph¢n8 
wUh lnstrumen~s?, 32 ARIZ. L. RBv. 789, 792-95 (1990) (doscnalng tbc d'dliculties at!A:ndoot In the 
classification ofcredit cand receivables due to dlffi:riog roqulmnents under Cwnont Article 9 for per­
fection ofvarious types ofcollateml). 
219 2000) CIRCUMVENllON OFTHE BANKRUPTCYPROCESS 
tion ofan interest in a particular asset with any certainty. 113 
For example, credit card receivables, depending upon the tenus of the 
underlying credit transaction could, under Current Article 9, be classified 
as instruments, general intangibles or accounts. A credit card issuer secu­
ritizing its credit card receivables currently has no unequivocal assurance 
that it has classified the asset properly. Accordingly, the issuer can have 
little confidence that the correct steps necessary to protect the transferor's 
interests were in fact taken. This uncertainty is a threat to the value of the 
transferor's investment as well as to the efficacy of the entire 
transaction.114 
To address these concerns, Revised Article 9 includes a wider variety 
of rights to payment arising from the transfer of rights in both tangible and 
intangible property within the defmition of "accounts."115 The sale of the 
right to payment arising from the sale, lease, license or assignment of auto 
loans, consumer credit (including credit card receivables), equipment 
leases, aircraft leases, public utility services, hotel services/leases, insur­
ance, franchises and intellectual prope~ are all deemed to create accounts 
under the Revised Article 9 definition.' 6 Thus, there is no doubt that the 
securitization of, for example, intellectual property futures are accounts 
and thus subject to the filing and priority rules of Revised Article 9. 117 
Once properly filed, an account transferee will be able to predict with cer­
tainty that its transfer will survive the strong ann powers of the originator's 
113. Under Current Article 9, insttuments can be perfected by possession, Wbort:lS sener.>I iol:lagi­
bles can be perfected only by the filing of • finam:iog stltemenL U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9·31» (1992 & 
Supp. 2000). 
114. Curioasly, the volume of c:rodit can! r=ivablc-blck<d securities issued io the market cn-cr the 
past decade does not suggest that this uncertaioty in the underlying law b:ls chilled the enthusiosm or 
either investors or issuers. s~e supra notes 49·51. 
liS. This exteusioo of the concept of "aCCOUDts" in R<vised Article 9 b:ls the effect of n:duciog the 
lllllge of assets wbich will qualify as goner.>! intlllgibles and poymcnt inl:lllgibles. Stt U.C.C. § 9­
102(42) (Proposed Revision 1998). To illustrate. a tieensor's pl)111C11t under a soliwan: Uc:ensc is 1111 
accounL whereas the tiecnse itself is a goner.>! intmgiblc. 
116. Sioce the issuance oftheso-cillcd "Bowie-Bnnds" io 1997 (SSS miltinn of=t·blcked ....,. 
rities hack<d by myalties from the futon: sale of David Bowie's fiiSI twenty-five album;), Lllci:ll!o 
PaVliiDIIi. Michael Jackson, fron Maiden,JDIIIIJCU. as well as theestlles ofEhis Prtslcy, Joboleunnn, 
Tuni Hendrix. Bob Marley, Jeay Clan:i:l and Kurt Ccblin blve issued bonds blck<d by roy:lilies ex­
pected to be eamcd by existing rccotdings in the future. Pinnccn:d by investment baakas on bch:llfof 
David Bowie, these secnritizations of what are essenti:illy intciiCCIU:ll property futures bl>"C becoau: n 
more common phenomenon. lnYCSimcot banker David l'UIIman, mchitcet of lhe BO\\ie deol obscn"ed: 
"[t]hele is a tremendous shift in wealth from lwd oss~ and mooufuelllrin!l-10 inlelleetunl 
property [] cntcr1ainmenL" Kathy Bcrgen,JOO SiuJns oJPmTUOtti? Star.r Tum ro Stturitlmtlon, SUN· 
SEN1lNEL (Ft. Lauderdale). Dec. 6, 1997, ot 16C. avaUable at LEXIS, News LibZill)', Sunsea File; su 
also lrv Lichtman, }OQJt Jett Song A Fintuu:ilz/ Rockt?, BIWlDARD, ScpL IS, 1998, tll"lzi/able at 
http:flwww.billboanl.comfdaily/0915_02.btml; Peter Newcomb, Duul Men Earning, FoRBES, Mar. 22, 
1999, available at <hllp:l/www.fOlbes.com> (last visited Oct. ZT, 2000): Brendon Westnn, The Btmds 
Fo111U!rly Kizown as Anists, ROB MAG. REP., May 1999, available at <hllp:l/www.pullmllllco.comf 
lllliclc095.htm> (last visited Oct. ZT, 2000). 
117. See U.C.C. § 9-102{42) (Pioposed Revision 1998). 
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trustee in bankruptcy. 
B. 	 Article 9's Expanded Scope: Inclusion ofSales of "Payment Intangi­
bles" and "Promissory Notes" 
In addition to governing accounts and chattel paper sales transactions, 
Revised Article 9 extends its coverage to the sale of payment intangibles 
and promissory notes. 118 Payment intangibles, a newly identified category 
of collateral defined in Revised Section 9-102(61), are a subset of general 
intangibles,119 but one in which "the account debtor's principal obligation 
is a monetary obligntion."120 Read together with the expanded definition of 
"account," the residual category of "payment intangibles" means that all 
conceivable payment streams are governed by Revised Article 9.121 
The classic example of a payment intangible is a loan pool participa­
tion. Some drafters and commentators thought that the sale of promissory 
notes and loan pool participations ought not be subject to Revised Article 9 
at all. Under current law,loan pool participations are deemed to be general 
intangibles, and thus, their sale falls outside of the reach of Current Article 
9. Because, however, securitizations may involve the sale of loans, and 
because securitization market participants were looking to Revised Article 
9 to eliminate the uncertainty inherent under current law, a compromise 
was reached: sales of such assets were included under Revised Article 9, 
but purchasers of loan pool garticipations were not subject to the Revised 
Article 9 filing requirement. 22 As such, a security interest in payment in­
tangibles and promissory notes subject to sale are automatically perfected, 
thus eliminating the uncertainty present under current law and ensuring the 
118. See id. § 9-109(a)(3). ("[T]bis article applies to .•• a sale of accounts, cballel paper, poymcnl 
inlangibles, or promissmy notes ....; The inclusion of these assets within Article 9's realm docs nol 
mean that all of the Article 9 rules apply-e sale of payment intangibles ond promissory notes are 
merely subject to the rules addressing the issues of perfection and priority. 
119. Genctal intangibles uc a ''residual category of personal property'' under Revised Article 9. /d. 
§ 9-102 official crnt S.d. Revised Section 9-102(a)(42) states: ''any persona1 property, including things 
in action. other than accounts, chattel paper. commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, 
goods, instruments, invesbnent propcrty,letter-of-credit rigbts,letters of credi~ money, and oil, gas, or 
other minctals bofore extraction" are genctal intangibles. ld. § 9-102(a)(42). Examples cited In the 
Qfllcial Comment include inlellectual property and the rigbt to payment of a loon of funds !halls not 
evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument ld. § 9-102 official cmt. S.d. 
120. ld. § 9-102(a)(61). Ofllcial Comment S.d to the definition offers the following cxplllnation ond 
examples: "payment intangible" is a subset of the definition of "genctal intangible," nnd the sale of n 
general intangible is subject to Revised Article 9. See id. §§ 9-102 official cmt. S.d, 9·109(a)(3). 
Virtually any intangible rigbt could rise to a rigbt to payment of money once one hypothesizes, for 
example, that the account debtor is in breacb of its obligation. The term "payment intangible," how­
ever, cmbr.tces only those genctal intangibles ''under wbicb the account debtor's principal obUgotion Is 
a monetuy obligation." See id. § 9-102 official cmt S.d. 
121. See Paul M. Sbupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securiri:tJrions: A Brief History, 73 
AM.BANKR. W.l67,176 (1999). 
122. See I SECURmZAnoN OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 10, at § 6.02(8) (describing loon pool 
participations as not genctally covered onder Current Article 9). 
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priority position ofloan pool purchasers as against competing buyers.123 
C. 	Enhanced Assignability ofAccounts, General Intangibles (Including 
Payment Intangibles) andPromissory Notes 
Current Section 9-318(4) explicitly denies the effectiveness of con­
tractual provisions that prohibit the assignment of accounts!24 The original 
justification for the enactment of this provision was to respond to the eco­
nomic reality of accounts and other rights under contracts increasingly be­
ing used as collateral for financing and the importance of facilitating such 
financing.125 Even prior to the enactment of Section 9-318, courts com­
monly recognized the commercial business practices of account financing 
and often "construed the heart out of prohibitory or restrictive tem1s and 
held the assignment good."126 
Revised Sections 9-406(d) and (f) expand Current Section 9-318(4)'s 
free assignability policy to accounts, chattel paper and promissory notes, 
specifically addressing both restrictions and prohibitions on assignment of 
such property.121 Revised Section 9-406(d) renders ineffective any provi­
sion in a c6ntract between a debtor and an account debtor which prohibits 
an assignment or transfer of an account. chattel paper, general intangible. 
payment intangible or promissory note!28 Moreover, Revised Section 9­
406(f) extends this extinguishment of anti-assignment provisions to any 
provision found in statutes or common Iaw!29 Revised Section 9-406(e) 
renders Revised Sections 9-406(d) and (f) inapplicable to sales ofpayment 
intangibles and promissory notes, but Revised Sections 9-408(a) and (c) 
123. See U.C.C. § 9-309(3) (Proposed Revision 1998) ('"The follo~>ing s:auity iolcrests lllC per­
fected whco !bey llllad!: •.• (3) a sale of a payment lntmgible."). The cxtaulon ofcovern:;c ofRe­
vised Article 9 to the sale of these ea!cgories of assets could result in o =t s=witiznlion ofsucb 
assets aod ICpiCSCOl5 a drifting away fi:om the historical rule ogninst =t liens tllld iolcrests in per­
sonal JliOpclty. The allowance ofIW!omalic perfi:ction means thn! those socking to J11Ucb= (or usc us 
collateral) p10missory notes or payment intangibles C!lllllot slmply SCillCb the public filing rc<ords to 
cletonnine whclhcr aoothcr patty bus au inlcrcst in sucb BSSeiS. Purchnscrs tllld plllles SCCUfed by these 
types ofcollateral, to SlllisfY their prior cocumbrance concems, must sccun: 1!!1 ullirmrlh"C reprcs:ntn­
tion fi:om the origim:!or thE! no other patty bus atty inlucst in sucb payment lnl!:ngiblcs. Sec I;<r.zrally 
Shupack, :mprrz noll: 121, ll1176. 
124. 	u.c.c. § 9-318(4) (1992). 
125. 	 Seeid. §9-318(4)officialc:mL2. 
126. 	Sec id. 
127. 	See U.C.C. § 9-405 official c:mL S (Proposed Revision 1998). 
128. Under eun.nt Article 9, tbc:rc Is no specific definition of n paymcnl iul!lngib!l>-ll!c:rcly the 
descriptive calegOly of a gcneml lntmgible for the payment of money due or to become due. See 
U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1992). Receivables !hilt are not chllt!cl poper or instnnncniS end lh:!t crc not,.. 
cotliiiS because tbcy do not arise fi:om the sale or !ease ofgoods or provision ofsemces nre gcnernl 
intangibles for the payment ofmoncy--memling paymcnl iul!lngiblcs. 
129. It was thougbt Ill the time Cwrcnt Section 9-318(4) ,.,. =cled lh:!t most of tho l!ltll­
assigmnent provisions in the law hBd lmgcly c!isqlpo=d. Revised Secllon 9-406(d) continues the 
codification of the concept offu:c assignability, in both Jaw and contmct, for both clult!d p:!pCt t111d 
accounts. Sec U.C.C. § 9-406(d) (Proposed Revision 1998). 
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step in to fill this void by making invalid attempts to restrict a Revised Ar­
ticle 9 sale of payment intangibles and promissory notes.130 This section 
further extends the prohibitions on contractual and legal restrictions on 
assignment to health-care insurance receivables and certain other general 
intangibles. 131 
The expanded invalidation of provisions restricting the assignment of 
promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables and payment intangi­
bles is limited, however, by Revised Section 9-408(d). 132 This subsection 
has the effect of preserving the rights and obligations of account debtors 
and those obligated on a ~romissory note, notwithstanding the assignment 
of such account or note.1 3 This means that, notwithstanding contractual 
130. See id. § 9-408(a), (c). 
131. Revised Sectica 9-408(a), (c) declares ineffective any ccallllehlal letm or Jaw, slatute or regu· 
latiOil that 
(J) would impair the creation, attachment or perfection of a security interest; or 
(2) provides that the creati011, attachmellt or perfection of the security inleresllll>Y give rise 
to a default. breach, right of recoupment, claim. defense, termination, right of tennination, 
or remedy under the promissory note, health-care-inswance receivable, or general inlangi· 
ble. 
ld. 
132. See id. § 9-408(d). 
To the extent that a tenD in a promissmy note or in an agreemCIJt between an account debtor 
and a debtor which relates 10 a heallh care ioswance receivable or general inlangible or n 
rule of law described in snbsectica (c) would be effective under Jaw other thnn this article 
but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c), the creation, anachmcot, or perfection of a se· 
curity interest iD the promissory note. healtb-care-insurance receiwble, or general intangi­
ble: 
(I) is not enforceable against the pmca obligated on the promissory nole or the nc· 
count debtor: 
(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the person obligaled on the promissocy 
note or the account debtor; 
(3) does not require the person oblignlcd on the promissory note or the account debtor 
10 recognize the security interes~ pay or rendl:l' performance 10 the secuted party, or accept 
payment or perfOrmance fiom the secured party; 
(4) does not endUe the secured party to usc or assign the debtor's rights undl:l' the 
promissory nole, health-care-insnrance receivable, or general intangible, including nny re­
lated information or materials furnished to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to tho 
promissory nole, heallh-care-inswance receivable. or general inlaDgible: 
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or hove access to noy 
lrade secte1s or ccafidential information of the person obligated on lhe promissory note or 
the account debtor: and 
(6) does not entitle the secured party to eaforce tbe security interest in the pmmissmy 
note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intaogib1e. 
ld. 
133. See id. Official Connnent 5 10 Revised Section 9-408 further mnkes clear that the term "nc· 
coun1 debtor," defined in Revised Section 9· 102(3), refers 10 
the parry, olher than the debtor, 10 a general inlaDgible. including a permi~ license, fran. 
chise, or the like, and the person obligated on a heallh-care-insnrance receivable, which is a 
type ofaccount The definition of "account debtor" does notlimil the term 10 persons who 
ore obligated 10 pay under a general intangible. Rother, the tcrm includes aU persons who 
ore obligated on a general inlaDgible. including those who are obligated to render perform· 
ance in exchange for payment. 
Jd. § 9-408 official cmt 5. 
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provisions or laws prohibiting transfer, the sale of payment intangibles is 
now provided for under Revised Article 9 without affecting the substantive 
rights of the party obligated under such accounts or promissory notes. 
In the same way that Cwrent Section 9-318(4) was enacted for the 
purpose of facilitating account-based financing, Revised Sections 9406 
and 9408 have expanded the scope of the anti-assignment provisions to 
reach commonly securitized assets. Revised Sections 9406 and 9408 
enhance the ability of debtors to securitize a broader range of assets by 
limiting the circumstances an asset transfer would be prohibited by contract 
or by law. 
D. Expanded Definition of "Proceeds" 
Current Article 9 defines "proceeds" as what "is received upon the 
sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."1 ,. 
Revised Article 9 expands the definition of "proceeds" to include, "what­
ever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchan~, or other disposition 
of collateral,'' and "rights arising out of collateral. "1 The significance of 
this change is primarily realized once the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
One ofthe central tenets of the bankruptcy ststem is its respect for pre­
petition security interests granted by the debtor. 36 A security interest that 
is perfected under state law (and not vulnerable to defeat under the prefer­
ence and fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Codei37 is 
fully effective in bankruptcy to the extent of the value of the collatera1.138 
In certain defined circumstances, however, Bankruptcy Code § 552 offers 
an exception to this rule. Section 552(a) cuts off secured parties' interests 
in collateral acquired by a debtor after that debtor has filed a petition in 
bankruptcy, except to the extent that ~est-petition collateral is proceeds of 
original collateral.139 Section S52(b) iiO provides that a secured party's in­
134. U.CC § 9-306(1) (Supp. 2000). 
135. See U.CC § 9-102(a)(64) (Proposed Revision 1998). '!he cxp311dcd delillitionof"proc:ccds" is 
designed !D cxpfic:itly inelude ""cash or stcc:k dividc:nds distriburcd on llCCOUDI of =urilics or other 
investment property that is original collaleraL• ld. § 9-102 officilll CIDL 13.n. '!he Official Commmt 
states that !he IeYised delinilion of "proc:ccds" was 1D cxplic:idy reject !he holdiug of In "' Hasti<. 2 
F3d 1~2 (lOth Cir. 1993), wbich bdd that in hanbup!Cy, postpelilion C1Sh di\idc:nds on stcc:k subject 
!D a prepetilion pledge are not "proc:ccds" under Baulaup!Cy Code § SS2(b). 
136. See 11 U.S.C §§ 506,361 (1994). While this conec:pt is aot explicitly found in the II:Xt of !he 
Baalaapley Code, it c:aa be infened from !he language or§§ 506 and 361. 
137. See ld. § S44 (gmnliag so-<:allcd "strong.:ma" powm !D the lniS!CC for the defe:lt of unper· 
feercd secarity inJeresiS, fraudulent tr.msfm and pmereaecs). 
138. Seeld. § 506. 
139. Seetion552(a) of!he Bankrupley Cede provides that "(c)xcept llS provided in subsection (b) ••• 
property acquired by the esJate or by the debtor after the commc:ncemc:nt or the = is aot subject to 
any lien resulting from any =urity agreement entered iaro by the dchtor before the ..,m.,eemc:n\ or 
!he case." ld. § 552(a). 
140. Seclion 552(b) provides an cxec:plioa ro the rule aaaouaccd in § 552(a) that, in !he =uriliza· 
lion c:oete<1, potentlaDy swallows iL 
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terest in ''proceeds, product, offspring, or profits" of the collateral contin­
ues, notwithstanding the bankruptcy. 
The purpose of § 552(a) is consistent with one of the most commonly 
accepted norms of the bankruptcy system: to preserve the value of the es­
tate for the benefit of those parties with a claim to the residual interest in 
the debtor's estate (unsecured creditors), as well as to give the debtor a 
"fresh start."141 To the extent bankruptcy courts derive the definition of 
''proceeds" from Article 9,142 the expansion of the definition of "proceeds" 
in Revised Article 9 will serve to allow the secured party (or asset pur­
chaser) potentially to claim an interest in a greater number of the debtor's 
post -petition assets. 
This is relevant in the securitization context to the extent that the secu­
ritized assets fall under the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "proceeds." 
When a pool of securitized assets includes some assets that arise after the 
consummation of the original agreement creating a security interest, the 
assets are Article 9 "after acquired property .''143 These after acquired as­
sets, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 552(a), are at risk of being cut off 
from the claims of asset purchasers once the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
To the extent, however, that the securitized assets are not only after ac­
quired property, but also proceeds of the original collateral under the Bank­
ruptcy Code, then the creditor's interests in them is saved by § 552(b). 
Under Revised Article 9, the asset purchaser will have an enforceable 
claim to what is a broader definition of the proceeds of the original asset to 
[I]f the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the commencement or 
the case and if the security interest cn:aled by such security agiWnCDI extends tn property 
of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and lO proceeds, product, off· 
spring, or profits of such property, then such security iDieresl CXIeDds to such proceeds, 
produc~ offspring, or profits acquiled by the estate afler the commencement of the case to 
the extent provided by sueb security agreement and by applicable DODbanlaupl<:y l:lw, ex· 
cept to any extent that the court. after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the 
case, ordm otherwise. 
Id. § SS2(b)(l). 
141. The "fresh stan" rntioaale for banlauplcy, as well as its euabliDg discbarge provislaa, arc 
grounded in the notion that the long term rehabilitatiou of a debtor is in the best interest of the public. 
For a business, the opportUnity for a fresh slart may preserve jobs and offer the fum an apportualty 1o 
once again contribute to the commUciaJ economy. s~e id. § 1141(d). 
142. Courts have been inconsistent io their interpretation of what is meant by "proceeds, product, 
offspring. or profits" in § SS2(b). Moreover, the door left apea by the exception "except to aay exlent 
that the court ..• based on the equities of the case, ordm otherwise"' has only added to the inconsls.. 
Ieney of court opinioas with n:specllo this issue. ld. § SS2(b)(l). However, maay courts do rely upaa 
Article 9 language and state courts' intetpretalioo of the concept ofproceeds. Su. e.g., In rt Hastie, 2 
F3d 1042, 1045-46 (lOth Cir. 1993) (relying upoD state law definitioa of "proceeds" iD boldiDg thai a 
security Interest in stock divideads were DDI perfected because they were Dol the subslilul<: for disposed 
of stock (the collateral), as per § 9-306(4)); In r< Bumper Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Clr. 
1990) (holdiDg that Anicle 9's defialtioa of "proceeds" was the defiailioa 1o be applied in deletmialng 
the scope of Banknlplcy Code§ SS2(b)); J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. Fiist Nal'l Bank, 779 F.2d 1242, 1246 
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a party with a security ialel'esl ia J<Ceivables and accoaDts bad a perfected 
ialel'est as proceeds, ia a payment J<Ceived post-petitioa pursuanllo a pre-petilioa accouat). 
143. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1992 & Supp. 2000). 
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the same degree as ifthe asset was original collateral. 
E. Revised Article 9 's Market Impact 
Revised Article 9's expanded definition of "accounts," the allowance 
of a broader range of asset sales to be subject to Article 9, the inclusion 
within Article 9's reach of sales of payment intangibles and promissory 
notes, the expanded definition of "proceeds," as well as the enhanced as­
signability of prime assets for securitization will do much to facilitate the 
further expansion of the market for asset-backed securities. That this is a 
positive development for the commercial markets appears to be an implicit 
assumption of the Revised Article 9 drafters. The Article 9 revisions, to­
gether with the Bankruptcy Code amendment. create risks to the securiti­
zation originator and its unsecured creditors. In light of these risks, the 
assumption that the market for securitization ought to be further facilitated 
must be rigorously challenged. 
V. PROPOSED BANKRUPI"CY AMENDMENT PROVISIONS 
The current bankruptcy debate, both in the popular press144 .and amoDJi 
academics,l45 has primarily centered around consumer-related issues! 
The furor over bankruptcy reform arose because ofthe perceived abuses of 
the bankruptcy system by consumer debtors; at least that is what the con­
sumer credit industry has spent $61.6 million dollars since 1987 getting 
144. See. e.g., And!ow Conte, E<uy Cm/U SeiS Up Some fur a Hard FaU, CINCINNA11 Posr, JLIIIC 
24. 199!1. at !A, available at199!1 WL 4337988; William P. DclahiiDI. Banbvptq I.mr. Go E<uy on 
the Rich, WASH. PosT, June 7, 199!1. at A18; Lisa Hill Penning, Bcmknlptty Reform Bills Woo.J/d MakJ: 
11ring.J Worse: Those Deservbrg RclkfWould Ftu:e Unfair Ob:tacle3, L.A. TIMEs, June 21, 199!1, Ill 
AM4, availoble at LEXIS. News Libnuy, !..at File; Michele Jnddin, U.S. HOlM Giva a Boost to If_. 
Credit Card 8/uula. HARlFORD CoURANT, June 23, 1999, Ill A15; JllCOb M. SchlcsiDgcr, Hll'.ue Ap­
proves Banbvptq Ovul:auJ Amid Criticism Btl/ May Be Too Tough, WALL Sr.J. Mny 6. 199!1, Ill 
A28. 
145. See. e.g., KAREN GRoss, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS (1997); Bn:u<la Anthony, "S.Wtant/QI 
Alnue"" under &<:lion 707{b) ofthe Bcmknlptq Code: A11".triam Connm-.en Leam Dedarilrg BanJ:­
ruptq M<!J1 Cease ID be a Way Out, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 535 (199!1); Douglas 0. Balnl, Essay: BanJ:­
ruptq's U=>ntested A:doms, 108 YALE W. 573 (1998); Colloquium, Co1UtlmU Banbvptey, 61 
FORDHAM!... REv. 1311 (1999); Carlos ]. CUevas, The C011S1117!U Cm!Jt lr.dustry. 11-.e Co/Uli1T".#' 
BanbvptqSystem. Bcmknlptq Code Sectlun 707(6). ar:d Justice: A CrltlctJJ Ar.al,},ls ofthe Cun=r.u 
Bcmknlptq System, 103 CoM. W. 359 (1998); Susan L. Ddlll1lall, Or.ce Is No/ EroliOgh: Presero:brg 
COilSflmUs" Rig/rts to BanlrnJptq Proledion, 741ND. W. 455 (199!1); Edith H. Jones &<.Todd J. Zy­
wicki. It"s Time/or Means-Testing, 199 B.Y.U. L. REv. 177 (199!1); Robert K. Rnsmussen. Bel:avioral 
Econmnks. The Economic Analysts of&nkruptq Law ar:d the Pricing ofCredi/, Sl VAND. L. REv. 
1679 (1998); Hemy 1. Snmmer, emu.. ofthe Ct111JU1114r BanbvptqF.zploslon: Debtur Air= orE<uy 
Credit?, 27 HoFS"IRA L. REv. 33 (1998); Elizabeth Warren. The Banbvptq Crlslr, 73 IND. W. 1079 
(1998). 
146. See genual/Jf, GRoss, SliP"' nolO 145 (discussing the mlc ofbonbuptoy in our cultun> lllld its 
impact upon I:ODSIIlDUS). 
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Congress and the public to believe.147 In two consecutive Congressional 
sessions, the House and Senate proposed Bankruptcy Reform Bills which 
included a variety of provisions designed to make bankruptcy less attrac­
tive and more burdensome·to consumer debtors.148 The House passed its 
version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 on May S, 1999, and on 
February 2, 2000, the Senate passed its version of the Bill by a veto proof 
margin ofeighty-three to fourteen.14~ Currently, the House and Senate bills 
are in committee for reconciliation. 150 
In addition to the consumer-focused amendments, there is a little­
noticed and mentioned provision contained in both the House and Senate 
versions ofthe bill which, ifenacted, will have the effect ofcompleting the 
institutionalization of securitization transactions by allowing certain secu­
ritization investors to circumvent the bankruptcy process. Both the House 
and Senate versions of the bankruptcy reform bill contain a provision 
amending § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,151 which broadly defines the 
scope of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. This proposed section152 provides 
that "eligible assets" transferred by the debtor in connection with a securi­
tization are affirmatively deemed to be excluded from the debtor's bank­
ruptcy estate.153 
147. This figun: includes $50.8 million in Political Action Committee (PAC) contribudons nnd $10.8 
million in soft 1110110)" donations. According to a Commnn Clwse study on lobbying efforts by the 
consumer crodit indusby, 420 Representatives and ninety-eight Senators bavelllken contributions !tom 
blllllcing and consumer CICdit interests. Senators bave Jeceivcd, on average, $100,836 each !tom con· 
sumcr CICdit indusby PACs. Members ofthe House ofRepresentatives have received nn average of 
$47,7241iom this gmup's contribudon coffers. By compcrison, the tobacco lndusby, during the some 
period, spent Jess than halfofthe CICdlt canllndusby's $61 million In soft money donntlons nnd conlri· 
budons to PACs. Going for Brolrl:: Big Money. Big Banks & lkmltruptcy, at hUp~l 
www.commoncausc.oJEfpublicntlons/goingforbmkt.btm (last visill:d July 7, 1999}. 
148. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. (2000). 
149. Eric Schmitt, &nail! Approves Bill to Toughen lkmltruptcy IIJJies, N.Y. Thd!!s, Feb. 3, 2000, at 
AI. 
150. &e supra note 9; see also American BanknJplcy Instllule Legislative Watch, available at 
hUp:l/www.abiwodd.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2000}. 
151. Section 541 ofthe Bll!llauptcy Code reeds in part: 
(a) The commencement ofa esse under section 301,302 or 303 ofthis tide areatcs nn esintc. 
Such estate is comprised ofall the following pmpcrty, wherever located and by whomever 
held: 
(I) Except as pmvidcd in subsections (b) and (c}(2) ofthis section, all legal or equlln· 
ble interests ofthe debtor In property os ofthe commencement ofthe esse. 
11 u.s.c. § 541 (1994). 
152. H.R. 833 was passed by the House of Representatives on May 5, 1999. Stephen Lablllon, 
Howe Votes to Malrl: It lbugher to Escape Debt Through Persono/ lkmltruptcy, N.Y. Thd!!s, May 6, 
1999, atA28. 
153. 	 S. 625 was intmduced on May 3, 1999. Section 903 ofthc Scnall: bill=ds: 

SEC. 903. ASSET·BACKED SECURITIZATIONS. 

Sccdon 541 oftlde 11. United Stales Code, Is amended 

(1) In subsection (b) by striking 'or" at the end ofparagraph (4); and 

(2} by Jedcsignaling paragraph (S} ofsubsection (b) os paragraph (6}; 

(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) ofsubSl'ction (b) the following new paragraph: 
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Read together with the expanded definition of "account" in Revised 
Section 9-102(a)(2),154 the term "eligible assets," as used in the bankruptcy 
bill, is a broad one indeed.155 Receivables (including credit card receiv­
ables), intellectual properl;y licenses, cash and securities are all deemed to 
be "eligible" for purposes ofthis provision. 156 
Moreover, the provision amending the§ 541 definition of"bankruptcy 
estate" in Senate bill 625 and House bill 833 is a substitution of Congres­
sional judgment for that of state courts on the issue of whether an asset 
transfer is a transfer of collateral or a "true sale," which federalizes the 
(S) lillY eligible asset (or proceeds lhe:eol), to lhe extend 11m sueb dlgible 
asset was transfenccl by lhe debtor, bcfo.: lhe dale ofCOIIUI!Cllccment oflhe 
case, to an eligible entity in c:onnedion wilh an ossct-backcd securillzalioD. 
except to lhe cx1c1tt sueb IISSCI (or pmoecds or value lhe:eol) may be reeov· 
cred by the trustee IDldcr section 550 by virtue or1.\'0idmce IDldcr section 
S48(a); or; and 
(4) by adding atlhe end of!he following: 
(e) Forpmposes oflhis scc:tioD.Ihe following definitions sh!ll "PP'IY: 
(I) The term 'asset-backed securitizallon' IIICIDS a IIIDSIOtlon In "tleb 
eligible assets transfened to an eligible entity are used as lhc SOIIICC of 
payment on securities, lhe most senior of "tleb are Jllcd br.'CSimcnl 
grade by I or mo.: nalionally reeognizl:d securities nling organb:BI!OD. 
issued by an issuer. 
(2) The term 'eligible asset' m...,... 
(A) financial assets ("meluding intorcs!S lbcrotn and proceeds lh=IJ. 
eilhc:r fixed or revolvillg, including n:sldcntial and co~mort· 
gage loans, consumc:r rocoivablcs,lnlde J:Celvablcs, and lccc m:clv· 
abies, that, by lhelr terms, convert into cosh within a finite period, 
plus 1111)' rights or olher assets designed to llSSUrC lhe sezvlelng or 
timely clistnlnnion ofpmoeeds to security boldels; 
(B) cash; and 
(C) securities. 
(3) The term 'eligible entity' m...,... 
(A) an issuer; nr 
(B) a 1rust, COIJIOratiOD. partnership, or olher entity Cllf!l!8ed cxdu­
sively in lhe business ofacquiring and IJinsferrlng cllgiblc assets dl­
noclly nr indiroctJy to an issuer and talcing actions ancillay thereto. 
(4) The term 'issuer' moans a1rust, co1p0ratioa, partnership, or olhcr en­
tity engaged exclusively in lhe business ofacquiriDg and holding eligible 
assets, issuing securities booked by eligible asscts, and talcins actions an­
cillary lhc:rcto. 
(S) The term 'trsnsfertcd' means lhe debtor, IDldcr a wriu.n "81ccmcnl, 
~:pn:scnted and wammtcclllm dlgible assets \\...., sold, con!n1nned, or · 
otherwiso onnveycd wilh the intenlion of removing lhem &om lhe osi!!C 
of!he debtor pumii!Dt to subsection (bXS), lnespectivc, "itholltllmlta­
tionof­
(A) wbetber lhe debtor dbeclly or indbeclly obtained or bcld an Inter· 
est in lhe issuer or In anysecurilics iswcd by lho issuer; 
(B) wbetber lhe debtor bad an obllgalion to ~:purcbsse or to <crvlcc 
orsupcmse lhe <crvlcing ofall or liD)' portion ofsueb ellglb!c assets; 
or 
(C) the ~n of sueb sale, conlributiOD. or olhcr com-ey· 
aocc fur lax, aecoll!lling, regulatory 1:p0rtiag orothcrp1IIJIOSCS.
S. 625,10Sih Cong. § !103 (2.000). 
154. See.uq>1i1pp.218-20. 
iSS. Seesrqmrpp.218-20. 
156. See -"!1'111 pp. 218-20. 
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analysis.157 The provision's definition of "transfer'' deems an asset transfer 
to be a sale as long as the characterization is consistent with the parties' 
intention.158 This definition does more than provide a safe harbor for secu­
ritization transactions; it has the potential effect ofexcluding assets used as 
collateral from a debtor's bankruptcy estate in abrogation of the policy 
defining the estate broadly in order to facilitate business reorganizations 
whenever feasible.159 The net effect of this provision will be to carve out 
ofthe debtor's estate any transfer that the parties declare to be a securitiza­
tion, even if under state law, courts would find it to be a transfer of collat­
eral in connection with a secured financing. 
The proposed revision to the definition of "estate" extends the risks 
that may be borne by the unsecured creditors of securitizing originators to 
cases where the parties have not formally taken the steps necessary to ef­
fectuate a true sale of a firm's assets. It further enables securitizing origi­
nators to obtain the benefits of the potential for lower effective rates of 
financing by declaring a securitization, as well as potentially reaping the 
benefits of a mischaracterized secured financing transaction (e.g., asset 
cash flow in excess of predictions at the time of pricing)-both at the ex­
pense ofa bankruptcy debtor's unsecured creditors.160 
Furthermore, the definition of"asset securitization" in the amendment 
results in the classification of some kinds of assets as included in the 
debtor's bankruptcy estate, and others as deemed excluded from the estate, 
with the distinction dependent upon the source of the consideration for the 
assets. The language identifies transactions that result in the issuance of 
not just debt obligations, but debt obligations consisting of at least one 
issue of securities rated investment grade or better by a nationally­
IS7. SeeS. 625, 106th Cong. § 903 (2000); H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 1012 (1999). See also supra 
notes 77-IJS and aocompanying 1<:xt. 
ISS. See supm note 84 ouU!niug lhc factors applied by s1ate courts In their dctenninllllon ofwhethcr 
a transfer is a "true salen or a transfer ofcollatenU in conncctlon with a scoured loan. When a deblor 
malccs an asset transfer, whether the transfer is a transfer of coUatenU for a =d loon or what I! 
known as a "true sale" Is dctennined under s1ate law. As noted p!CVJOusly, lhcrc Is no hnrd and fast 
rule that readily and consistenUy ma1ccs lbi:; dctermina!ion; ralhcr, courts apply a s.t of factors devol· 
oped under the common law. Cases have held that even when the parties intended a true sale, but 
certain indicia ofa secured loan were present, the transfer was made in coanccUon with a loan. 
159. See H.R. Rep. No. S9S, 9Sth Cong, lsi Scss. 367 (1977). Coasrcss intended that virtually of 
all debtor's property be included In tbe debtor's esta1c and be sorted out by intmst.s in tbc course oftbc 
bmlkruptey proceeding. See id. 
160. Un114d Slatu Comm/ltee an the Judtcll1ry Suhcommlltee on Admlnbtralive Over81zhl and the 
Courts: Hearing> Regarding the Buslne.u Banknlptcy Act, IOSth Congras (May 19, 1998) (testimony 
ofRandal C. Picker), available at WL 12760356 [hCJOinafter Picker Testimony] (arguing against adop­
tion ofthe broad cxemplion set forth in§ 215 because it would allow people to opt out ofbankruptoy). 
See also letter li:om Kenneth N. Klcc, Cbalmtan, Committee on Leglslllllon, Nllllonal Banlauptey 
Conference, to Senator Herb Kohl (Aug. 17, 1998) (referring to a provision Introduced to tbe tOSth 
Con~ss. identical to tbe provision Introduced In the lOth Congras) (on rue with author). 
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recognized statistical rating organization. 161 This definition bas the effect 
of limiting the "carve out" from the definition of "estate" to offerings only 
in the public markets. Accordingly, excepted from this exception are as­
sets securitized in private issuances that the market does not deem neces­
sary to rate. As described by one observer, "[t]his [provision] is wonder­
fully tailored to favor Wall Street over other sources of debt capital .••. 
[T]here is no rational basis for distinguishing amongst sources of debt 
capital based upon whether it results in the issuance of a [rated] 
'security.utl62 
The bankruptcy bill provision brings into sh&Ip focus the debate in the 
academic literature questioning the wisdom of what has been called the 
"privatization" of business bankruptcy. 163 On one side of this debate are 
those who see benefits to contractual substitutes for business 
bankruptcies.164 Those holding this position believe that the bankruptcy 
system is inefficient and generates high administrative costs. 16S 
Those holding the contrary position believe that the bankruptcy system 
works, but that it may still benefit from reform measures. 166 These com­
161. Otherwise knoM> as NRSROs. these taling agencies rcsean:b the efficacy of a securities issu­
ance and issue what are known as creditrnlings. There are =tlysix NRSROs eugaged i.ll the mling 
ofasset·bal:ked securities: Moody's. Slandanl & Poor's, Fiu:b Investors, Duff & Phelps. mCA Bauk· 
ing Analysis and Thomas Bankwall:b. The Securities aad Exc:haage Commissioo d<sigen!CS a rnling 
ageucy as ao NRSRO, usi.llg. in the abseuce of forD131 sland:uds, the aa:eplance by the marl:et its<:lf of 
the agency. Naticmally Recogoiz<d Statistical Rating Otj;aaizatioas, Exc:haagc Act Rei= Nos. 33­
7085, 34-34616, 59 Fed. Reg. 46314, 46316 (1994); Sbupock, supm noll: 68, at2296-97; fr.mcis A. 
Bottini. Jr.• Comment. An Extunimuion of1M Cun-~nt Stana of Raling AgtnC'iu tuul Propomls for 
limited Oversight ofSuch Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO!.. REv. 579,611 (1993). 
162. Comments of Kenoeth Ketterlog, Panner, Reed, Smith, Shaw and Mc:Cny (Iuoc 21, 1999) (on 
file with author). 
163. See A1aa Schwartz, A ContrrzctTheoryAPpTDCI<h to Business Bonkruptcy,I07YAI.EW.I807, 
1850 (1998) (oll'eriog arguments in favor ofprivotiziag baolauptcy); see generrzUy SIIS:IIl Block-Ueb, 
In the Ccuter of the Great Baolauptcy Divide: ComJl'Uing the Choice Amoog Business Baalauptcy 
Legislatioa and Private Law Alternatives (1999) (maauscript on file "ith outher) (descnoi.llg the schol· 
arsbip on coutract-based debt collectioo schemes as comp:ucd to the collective actioo ofbaolauptcy). 
164. See, e.g., Bany E. Adler, The Theory ofCorporrztelnsofl·ency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343, 352·54 
(1997) (proposing a metamorpbosizing form of equity, tcferred to as Chameleon Equity, in lieu ofdtbt 
as an altanative Ill the baolauptcy solution to finaocial distress); Micba<l Br:ullcy & Mic!uel Ro­
senzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter /1, 101 YAll! U. 1043, 1050 (1992)(outlliling n private­
law allemalive to baolauptcy); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A MellJt APProach ID OJtpa­
rrzte Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. 1.. REv. 51, 53-54 (1992) (proposiog bonlauptcy as a default rule sobjcct to 
alternative cootraclllal arrangements between debtors aod creditors); Ste\·en 1.. Scbw:uoz, Ru/Unling 
Freedom ofCrmtrrJ<t: A l!Dntnlptcy Ptulllligm, 77 TEx. 1.. REv. SIS, 534 (1999) (od>'Oc:lling for COD· 
!!actual alternatives to bankruptcy). 
165. BanyE. Adler, Financial and PoUtiatl Theories ofAmerican Corporrzte BanJ:ruptcy, 45 STAN. 
L. REv. 311,315-18 (1993) (noliog the high <OSts ofcorpDI:ltc baolauptcy). 
166. See Lyoo M. LoPucld, The Trouble wilh Clutprer 1/, 1993 WISC. 1... REv. 729, 729-31 (1993) 
(argui.llg that the major tlaw in Chapter II is that the proc:ess tal:es too loaS); ROD:lld J. Mana, BanJc. 
ruptcy and rhe Entitlements ofrhe Goremment: Whose Money Is it An}"">'• 70 N.Y.U. 1... REv. 993, 
1000 (1995) (arguing that government eatiUement to value for operatiog the baolauptcy S}'SieOI pre­
empts crediiOIS' complaints that they do not tee<ive the full value due to them); see genemlly GROSS. 
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mentators see benefits to collective debt collection, instead of contract­
based insolvency remedies, especially for those affected by bankruptcy 
without the resources to craft a fair bargain ex ante. 167 What the revised 
definition of estate does, however, is sanction a contractual alternative to 
bankruptcy for some creditors, at the same time leaving the bankruptcy 
system intact for others. Not surprisingly, it is the financial markets' most 
powerful participants who are allowed to contract out of the bankruptcy 
168
system.
VI. PREMATIJRE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SECURITIZATION: 

NORMATIVE IsSUES 

Embedded in the Current Article 9 and Bankruptcy Code provisions is 
the implicit assumption that securitization should proliferate and become n 
universal financing method. Such an assumption and the ensuing changes 
in the governing law serve to facilitate and encourage securitization trans­
actions, and thus inevitably raise two normative questions: first, whether 
given its significant effects on third parties, securitization transactions 
ought to be institutionalized to the degree provided for in Revised Article 
9, and second. whether we should adopt a system that not only sanctions, 
but endorses bankruptcy avoidance by a discrete and powerful class of 
creditors. When evaluating such questions, it is important to keep in mind 
that the widespread proliferation of asset securitization will likely result in 
some unintended (and intended) consequences for both the debtor and third 
parties. 
A. Securitization as a Strategy for Judgment Proofing 
In a series of articles, Professor Lynn M. LoPucki asserts that asset 
securitization is both a substitute for borrowing, as well as a strategy with 
the diabolical potential to offer companies a relatively streamlined method 
of judgment proofing. 169 Referring to asset securitization as "the silver 
supm note 145 (cbaUeogiog c:enaio aspectS of the baolauptey syslem while accepting the syslcm as a 
whole). · 
167. E.g. GROSS,supm note 145, atJOI (describing tho effect ofbaolauptey DD a doblor's uoseowod 
credilors and otber stakeholders); see Lyon M. LoPucki, The Unsecurt!d Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. 
REv. 1857 (1994) (citing TeREsA A. StlU.IVAN ET AI-, AS WI! FoRGIVE OUR DI!BTORS 294-98 (1989) 
(describing two classes of unsocurod credilors, involuntary (such as lort victims) and voluntary but 
uninformed (loss sophisticat<d credilors lacking tbe resoun:es to monitor), as needing the protection of 
a debt colk:ction f'I'OC'SS)). 
168. SuS. 625, 106th Cong. § 903 (2000); H.R. 833,106th Cong. § 1012 (1999). 
169. LoPuci;i, D<lllh o[Uability, supm note II, at S (noting that tochoological advances are conlriJ>. 
uting to the fail1110 of tho system for tho enforcement ofmDDey judgments); see LoPucki, The Esstntlal 
Structun, supra note 11, at 149 (observiDg that judgment proofmg is a relationsiUp between two entJ. 
ties where one generates high risks of liability while tho other owns a high level of assets); LoPucld, 
The lmfutoblt Logic, supra note II, at 56 (observing that asset securitizatioo is the most eiTocdvc 
judgment proofing tool cumntly available). But see Steven L. Schwan:z, The Inherent lrralloTUJI/ty of 
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bullet capable ofkilling liability, " 170 LoPucki posits that firms can use asset 
securitization to either intentionally or unintentionally render themselves 
devoid of assets, and thus judgment proof.171 LoPucki offers the following 
illustration: 
Through asset securitization, a company potentially could di­
vest itself of all of its assets, yet continue to use all of those assets 
in the continued operation of its business. To grasp the enormous 
potential, assume that, through a series of asset securitizations, 
Exxon Corporation disposes of all of its assets. As the cash from 
these transactions becomes available, Exxon distributes the cash to 
its shareholders in the form of dividends, leaving the company 
with neither assets nor liabilities. 172 
In this example, Professor LoPucki contemplates that a company could 
securitize virtually any asset through a sale and lease-back.173 He further 
observes that firms have the capacity to distribute the proceeds of the secu­
ritization to shareholders in the form of dividends, thereby rendering it 
improbable, if not impossible, that a creditor would be able to collect what 
it is owed.174 Professor LoPucki recognizes that while securitization has 
not been utilized on a widespread basis as a judgment proofing technique, 
it has proliferated because of the advantages finance-seeking firms have 
perceived-i!amely, its ability to allow investors to avoid the securitization 
originator's bankruptcy, thus reducing the cost of capital, relative to se­
cured and unsecured financing.175 
The risk that an increasing number of companies will become more 
Judgment Proofing, S2 STAN. !.. REv. I, 24 (1!199) (arguing lb:lt \\idcspROd usc ofsccuriliz:uiOD as a 
jodgment proofing tec!mique is lllllilcdy); Steven L Scbwan:z. Judgnwtl Proofms: A R9olmkr, S2 
STAN. L REv. 77 (1!199) (azguiagthatassetseeuritizatioa is UD!ike1y toeause the "de:ub ofliabitity"). 
170. LoPuoki.Deazhofliability,supranote ll,ot27. 
171. It!. at4. 

172 Id. at2S·26 (footaotes omitted). 

173. It!. at 24-25. LoPuc:ki sees the claager ofsecuritization as a judgment proofing too1as exp:u!d· 
ing beyowl those companies with receivables to other income producing asseiS. Su also Sbmktr &: 
Colletta, supra nore.60, at 1380. . 
174. See Lol'llclci, Death ofliability, supra oote I I, 0128-29. There arc theories piiiSW!tlt to wbicb 
creditms COD!d pursae the proceeds of the sccuritiud asscts-e\-eu in the h:mds of thin! p:ulies. Stile 
ftaaduleat conveyaace law ntight offer those creditors \\ilo were obleto lll)lUe that the sccuritiz:>doo 
was made with actual intent 10 "binder, delay or deli:iud" ood f01 less tlon "Rosonobly equh'Oimt 
value" the ability to avoid the asset sale. See UNIP. FRAUDUI.ENI'TAANsi'ERAcr§ 4(o) (1985). If the 
transfer, bowever, was 01 anus leagth, it is lllllilcdy these elemeoiS would be solisfied. Su ld. § 
4(a)(2){i) (1985). The paymeat of dividends 10 sb:lleboldcrs ntigbt be IIIJllled 10 ben li:iudul:at b:IDS­
fer, but as a pzactical 013tter, even ifsuch a conclusion was n:acbed by a cowt, the creditor \>ith unsot· 
isfied claims would find iiSelf !eying to collect the dividend poymeat from poteudally thous:uuls of 
slwebolders. S•e LoPucJ:i, DeazhofliabUizy,.supranote ll,ot29. 
17S. Lol'llclci,Deazh ofliabillly, supraaote II, at28-29. SttalsoScbwon:z,supiZJoote48, at lSI 
(explaining how asset securitization e'iminates asset..mcked securities in\"CSlClS' exposure lO origina­
tor's banktuptcy). 
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culturally acclimated to and proficient in the variety of judgment proofing 
techniques will likely become more pronounced as technology improves 
and companies become better informed. 176 This will result in inequities, to 
the extent that it will wound, ifnot kill, our existing liability system. 
Many of the risks attendant to securitization as a judgment proofing 
system have the potential to be present, however, when securitization is 
used not only as a liability limiting measure, but as a financing method as 
well. The wisdom of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code's facilitation of 
securitization as a financing method turns on whether the debtor, prior 
creditors and other thitd parties affected by a debtor's choices are better 
off--or at least not banned-relative to both unsecured credit and secured 
credit, by virtue of the debtor's choice to securitize its assets. 177 Whether 
securitization increases the risk of non-payment to these parties, and thus 
functions as both a financing method and a judgment proofing strategy, 
will be discussed in the following section. 
B. Third Party Effects 
Unsecured creditors rely for repayment, not on any collateral offered 
by debtors, but on the debtors' cash flow, coupled with the overall value of 
a debtor's unencumbered assets.178 Studies have concluded that many un­
secured creditors systematically fail to adjust their interest rates to later 
secured debt. 179 Due to a Jack of resources and information, unsecured 
creditors may not know or be in a position to understand the nature of the. 
other transactions their debtor has engaged in and thus do not react to an 
176. LoPucki. D<ath ofLiability, supra DOle 11, at 5. h has been noted that securiUza6on trnosuc· 
tioos are "mind numbingly complex," and therefotc require sophisticated computing technologies. 
BI)'Bil, supra oote Sl,at 11. 
These kinds of ttamactiDIIS would DDt even be possible without computers, first, to 
keep lra.ck of cash flow and loan defaults from iodividualloans and, second, to ensure lhDt 
all participants get OllllCIIy the n:tums duo them. To make this process work, each loon and 
Interest payment must be tagged as it flows from the borrower, to tho lntormodlory who 
made the loan, to tho special purpose vehicle, and, finally, to the end investor who bought 
the soeurity. MotcOver, all oC these tJaosfers must be documented in acconlonce wilb com­
plex legal requin:mcnta to OOSUtc that with each cash payment lhetc is a proper tmnsfor of 
both tetum and risk. W'tthout sophisticated computers, all of this would be impossible. ••• 
Computer-based analysis of cash flows is critical to understanding tho expceted returns for 
all participants. and it is puticularly important for understanding tho credit risk and the pro­
payment risk inherent in tbe transactions. 
!d. 
177. See Scott. supra note 34. at 1440-56 (oxamiolngthe wisdom and virtues ofsecured credit). 
178. Se< LoPucki, supra DOte 167, at 1931-32. Unsocurod creditors, who rely on both the casb flow 
of the debtor, as well as the debtor's residual asset pool for ropaymcn~ arc vic1im to n roducdon in 
n:sidual value each time a debtor uses its nnencumberod assets as collateral for a loan. This is similarly 
trUe wben a firm securilizes its assets. By deflnilion, such assets are no longer available to sadsfy the 
claims of the debtor's I1DSOC1ln:d creditors. See Scott. supra note 34, at 1445. 
179. Lucian Atyo Bebebock & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority ofSecured Claims 
in Bonkrupzcy, lOS YALE w. 857. 880-95 (1996) (observing that a secured creditor's priority may not 
always be fair). 
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increase in their risk of nonpayment. The transaction costs are too high in 
many cases for unsecured creditors to keep track of debtors' behavior or to 
charge an interest rate that reflects the heightened risk associated \vith se­
cured crediL 180 
Moreover, involuntary creditors-including tort claimants, suppliers, 
trade creditors, consumers with warranty claims, employees with wage 
claims and other small creditors-may not have the opportunity or re­
sources to conduct an initial diligence of debtor's potential to offer secured 
debt and therefore charge a compensating interest rate.181 Nor may they be 
capable ofongoing debtor monitoring. 182 
There is no reason to conclude that unsecured creditors will be any 
more responsive to a later securitization than to a secured financing. Unse­
cured creditors of securitizing debtors do not operate in a world with per­
fect information and they may not know if their debtor is securitizing its 
assets or of its plans to securitize. Therefore, their interest rates may not 
fully reflect the heightened risk to which they may become subject. 
Moreover, involuntary unsecured creditors do not have the opportunity 
to adjust the value of their claims in response to financing decisions of 
debtors.183 In the absence of such adjustments, to the extent securitization 
increases the debtor's risk of default, insolvency or results in a decrease in 
liquidi~, it has the potential to reduce the value of an earlier unsecured 
claim.1 Likewise, if a party becomes an unsecured creditor following a 
securitization, it may f"md itself a creditor of a debtor that is, for practical 
pmposes, judgment proof. 185 
The diminished chance of unsecured creditor repayment may be true 
both in and outside of the bankruptcy context, but the unsecured creditor's 
plight is especially poignant in bankruptcy. Because of the ability of ABS 
investors to avoid the bankruptcy process, fewer unencumbered assets will 
be included in debtor's bankruptcy estate for a debtor's residual 
claimants.186 Accordingly, gains to originators and ABS may be realized at 
the expense of unsecured creditors, employees and other third parties \vith 
180. Ste ill. See also !.my Lang et aL. Asset Sales, Finn Perjonnanrt, anJ! 1M Agency Com of 
Mamzgtrial Discrelion, J. OF FIN. Econ. :s7 (1995) 3-:S'l (arguing !hat "m:uu:lgem=t ..US !ISSdS whm 
doing so provides the cheapest funds to pursue its objc:cti>-.s rather than for operaliug dlicimcy rea­
sons aloue.""). 
181. S<e LoPucki, supra note 167, at 1895 (ideodfyiug inYoluntuy mditms os "nOlDdjusling 
mditors" aod :uguing that S<CUied mdit :ulvenely impacts these p:uties' ch:uu:<S forrepoymeol). 
182. See Bebchock & Fried, supra note 179,at 880.95. 
183. LoPucki, supra note 167, at1916 (explaining !hot mditOJS would decide dilf=Uy ifarm:d 
with the necessary information about the debtms and the l:lw). Other in>-oluntuy mditors Include 
v.ielims ofsecurities ftaud aud other ftauds (mcluding potent, copyright and tradcmork infriagemt~tts), 
ill. at 1896-!17, CUSIODieiS with pn:-paymeots,and wananty and insur.lllee cl:limants. 
184. See Minton et al, supra oDie 50, at 4. 
185. See supra pp. 22-30 and aa:ompanying notes. 
186. Lupica, supra note48. at 621-23. 
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a relationship to the originator in bankruptcy .187 
The significance and substantive importance of the definition of what 
assets are included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate cannot be overstated. 
Upon a bankruptcy filing, an estate is automatically created comprised of 
all of a debtor's legal and equitable interests in property, including property 
encumbered by security interests. 188 The holder of a security interest is 
entitled, at some point in the bankruptcy process, to walk away from the 
debtor's bankruptcy with the money owed to it by the debtor, up to the 
value of its collateral.189 It may not, however, decide to do so immediately 
and unilaterally-secured parties are subject to bankruptcy's automatic 
stay and are precluded from exercising any and all remedies they may have 
under state law with respect to the collateral until the stay has been 
Iifted.190 
The Supreme Court has recognized that secuted creditors have a cog­
nizable property interest in their collateral that must be protected, notwith­
standing debtor's bankruptcy. 191 This protection, however, may not be in 
the form of a grant of the creditor's specific state law rights, but rather 
mnst be in the form of a gtant of the value of its state law rights. l9Z The 
debtor's actual collateral (for example, the cash flow from accounts in an 
account financing context) may be necessary for an effective reorganiza­
tion under Chapter 11.193 In such a case, the secured creditor will be 
gtanted "adequate protection" of its interests, likely in the form of a collat­
eral substitute. 194 While this substitution may technically be the "indubita­
ble equivalent''195 of the secured creditor's collateral, it may still result in 
187. s~e GROSS. supra note 145, at 101 (discus!riug how viewing tbe baukruptcy process from the 
"s1IODgest and most powedill" creditOJS' perspective "addresses only a limited number of those nf· 
fected by a bankruptcy filing. It fails to take into acconnt the myriad parties touched by a bankruptcy 
case and the economic consequences of their situarions."). 
188. ll U.S.C. § 54l(a) (1994). See genenzlly CIIARu!sJORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRI1l'TCY 
274-81 (1997) (explaining§ 54l(a)(l) and its various ~<quiromcnts). 
189. See ll U.S.C. § 506(a){l994). 
190. Seeld. § 362(a). The automatic slay is tenninatcd by operation· of law upcn the debtor's grunt 
of a disclwgc. See ld. § 362(c)(2). Alternatively, individual creditors may petition the coun for wbal 
is known as "relief from Slay'' in order for it to be able to foreclose on its collateral. See ld. § 362(d). 
The essence of § 362(d) allows for a lifting of a stay with JCSpcct to a CfC!Iitor, unless thm Is n good 
bankruptcy reason to keep it in place. Seeld. 
191. United Slates v. Sec. Indus. Bank. 459 U.S. 70, 81 (1982). See also H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th 
Cong.. lst Sess. 339 (1977) (int=ding to give the secUicd creditor the value of the collateral for which 
be bargained). 
192. See II U.S.C. § 361 (1994). 
193. Seeld. § 362(dJ(2)(B). 

!94. Seeld. § 361. 

195. /d. § 361(3). This pbrasc was first used by Judge Lcamcd Hand,/n re Murol Holding Corp., 75 
F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935), and was later adopted by Congress in the laoguage of§ 361(3) of tho 
Bllllkruptcy Code. ll U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1997). 
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the incomplete protection of the creditor's interest. 196 
In contrast, when a debtor securitizes its assets, it sells them to a third 
party transferee. If the transfer is determined to be a true sale and aiJ nec­
essary steps are taken under applicable law to protect the third party's in­
terests (which may include the filing of a financing statement under Article 
9), upon an originator's bankruptcy, the assets are not deemed to be in­
cluded in the originator's bankruptcy estate. As such, the automatic stay 
does not apply to the asset transferee nor to the transferred assets, and these 
assets are not available to contribute to the debtor's "effective reorganiza­
tion." 
The securitized assets, most commonly "accounts" (as expansively 
defined under Revised Article 9), may be the only cash or cash equivalent 
that are available to pay trade creditors, employees, consumer claims and 
other unsecured creditors under a reorganization plan. If an originator's 
liquid collateral, such as "accounts," is deemed not to be part of the bank­
ruptcy estate available to fund the reorganization plan, then reorganization 
will not be feasible, leaving business failure as the only alternative. This is 
inconsistent with the federal policy of promoting the reorganization of a 
viable business for the benefit of not only the debtor, but also for those 
third parties affected by the continued existence of the debtor's business 
enterprise.197 
A policy carving securitized assets out of a reorganizing debtor's bank­
ruptcy estate also shifts the risk of a debtor's bankruptcy away from its 
largest financier to smaller, more vulnemble enterprises such as tmde 
creditors, consumers, employees, tort claimants and other unsecured 
creditors. The result will be a greater number of liquidations of potentia!Jy 
viable businesses, with smaller dividends paid to residual claimants. 
The Article 9 revisions, coupled \vith the proposed amendment to the 
definition of the bankruptcy estate, are a significant departure from a sys­
tem that has been in place for over one hundred years!93 At least one 
scholar has observed that the \visdom of securitization as a vehicle for 
bankruptcy avoidance turns on the efficiency of the bankruptcy reorgani­
196. The colla.t=llbal may be provided in substinne for. e.g., the cash Dow. moy be Jess liquid or 
loss slable. Moreover, the seeured crtdilor DUY bave a diff.,..t perception of the likelibcoc! ofsu=ss 
of debler's mng:mi2ation :md strongly pn:fcr lo fiquiclale iiS coll.llcral imln<dlalely. The boubuptcy 
procedure may make the accomplishm:DI of Ibis cl<siic impossible. Stt infra pp. 39-40 mul n=mpa­
nying notes. 
197. See GROSS. supra nole 145, at 101. 
198. See Mmball E. Thu:ht. ConlniCIUIJl Bankruprcy Waiw:r: Reron<iling "TMory, Prat:rict, and 
Law, 82 CORNEU. L. REv. 301, 303-{14 (1997) (describing the b:ullauptcy a\"Oidaucc leebaiqu:s lbal 
are cunendy nsed in praclice agaiiiSithc backdrop of the gcncoliud public policy as:Uust b:ullauptcy 
waiVCIS, and cballcnging lbe popular no~on lbat boubuptcy w:llvezs""' uncnlim:c:!blc uodcr lhc B:ml:­
ruptcy Cocle). Bur, c.f., Schw.utz,mpm nole 163, at 1808 ("'(P]arties =not conb'aCI in lending asrcc­
DlCIIIS lo usc a bankruptcy system other !ban the onc the stuc supplies."). 
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zation process. 199 If reorganization bankruptcy is inefficient, then securiti· 
zation may be an important vehicle for investor avoidance of the bank· 
ruptcy process, resultin~n cost savings that could be redistributed to other 
creditors of the debtor. If, however, reorganization bankruptcy is effi· 
cient, then an avoidance of bankruptcy by an exclusive class of creditors 
would likewise be inefficient.201 The efficiency or inefficiency of reor· 
ganization bankruptcy, while having been enthusiastically debated in the 
scholarly literature, has not yet been proven.202 Nevertheless, a rule ena­
bling a discrete, powerful class of creditors to opt-out of bankruptcy, even 
if it is an inefficient process, is unfair to those remaining parties who are 
unable to take advantage of this opportunity. 
C. The Long-term Impact ofSecuritization 
A rational firm in need of financing will seek the most cost-efficient 
financing method. The determination of cost-efficiency turns on whether 
managers making the financing decision are taking into consideration both 
long-term and short -term consequences. If, for example, securitized credit 
can be had at 100 basis points less than secured credit, all things being 
equal, rational managers, in consideration solely of the short -term effects, 
may choose to securitize their receivables, rather than offer them as collat­
eral for a loan.203 Correspondingly, if securitized financing is more expen­
sive in the short run than secured credit, due to poor asset quality or high 
transaction costs,204 a firm may choose to offer the assets as collateral for a 
loan. 
To conclude that securitization is in the best interest of a firm in the 
long run, however, begs a consideration of myriad factors beyond the 
short-term cost of the fmancing. The long-term costs of a securitization 
may embrace not only the cost of the money, but the qualitative and quan­
titative toll the financing takes on the debtor's remaining assets, and in 
turn, on a debtor's other creditors. Securitization transforms the debtor's 
expected cash flow into a lump sum infusion of cash. Whether this cash 
infusion has the potential to adversely affect a debtor depends upon what 
the debtor does with this cash, coupled with the quality and quantity of the 
iiebtor' s assets that remain following the securitization. · 
For firms to receive the greatest cost-of-financing-related benefit, they 
199. CbristopherW. Frost,As.wSecuritimlionandCorporateRiskAI/ocaJion, 72TUL. I.. RBV. 101, 
128·29 (1997) (describing the cosiS and benefits ofsecuritization). 
200. ld. 
201. ld. 
202. /d. 
203. Similarly. dehtDis may offer collalcr.ll for loans because secnrcd credit is cheaper lhnn unsc­
cnrcd credit See Scott, supra note 34, at 1450. 
204. Transactioa costs include. inter alia, costs of credit enhancement. Jcgal fees, accountiog fees, 
underwriting fees and valuation ofasset portfolio. See Lupica. supra note 48, at 606 n.48. 
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will likely securitize their highest quality assets. 205 If that is the case, then 
what assets remain with the debtor may, in some circumstances, be fairly 
characterized as junk. 2116 This junk may constitute, in the event of debtor's 
bankruptcy, the debtor's residual estate, resulting in a diminished dividend 
available to the debtor's unsecured creditors. 
The more significant variable to consider, however, in the evaluation 
of the long-term impact of a securitization is the use to which the proceeds 
of the asset sale are put. If the proceeds of the securitization remain liquid 
in the firm's coffers or are invested in a project with a positive value or one 
with a high degree of liquidity, then the securitzation may not adversely 
affect the debtor or third parties.207 
Experience has shown, however, that a predictable consequence of a 
securitization is the reduction of a firm's ratio of assets to liability risk. 203 
This occurs when the proceeds of securitization are used to make payments 
to creditors and/or distribute dividends to sbareholders.209 In such circum­
stances, what results is an expropriation of value from the firm's 
creditors.l10 
Moreover, as suggested by a study of the explanations for asset-backed 
securities issuances conducted by academics at Ohio State University, 
firms may use securitization as a way of expropriating value from existing 
205. An asset-baek<d security Issuance pricing is conlinge~~t upon lhe risk olfeted to lhe in,,.tor, 
which. in tum, is based upon the quality of the ODderlyiag asscL The lowerlhc quality of :111 ossct. the 
more expensive the financing will be for lhc originator-either due to a low aedjt rotins ia the nwket 
or10 the expeose ofa high degree ofcredit cobaocemenL See Curtin & Dcekolf, sopra note 67, at 203­
04. 
206. Lupica,supmnate48,at627. 
207. Such explicit policies would be nccasaiy because the ABS investors bilvc DO math-ation lO 
insist upon such provisions as a term of tlu:ir deal, oor do they have the inceati\ .. to eosage in debtor 
mooitoring. Se. Bcbcbuck & Fried, supra note 179, at 880.95 (dlscussing the ways that CO\U:IIIts in 
loao documcnl2lioa can be wed 10 contn:ll debtor's iaeflicieot behavior). 
208. See LoPucki, The lrrejiltable Logic, supra nate II, at 58. This point was iUnstr.lled by Pmfcs­
sor LoPucki in the following example: 
Exxon bas assets with a value slightly in excess of S40 billion and liabilities 10 unse· 
cured bank Jend:rs of exactly S40 billion. Exxon sells its assets for their filir m:ulcct ''31ue 
and pays S40 billion of the proceeds 10 the bauks. Exxon now bas assets of nominal ''due 
and no liabilities. By leasing its ossets back, it is able 10 operate its business in the same 
manner as before the ttansaction. Prior to this tr.ms:letion. n tort crcdilOr who \\"CD. ajudg­
ment against Exxon in the amount of SIO billion could IOOSO!Illbly ba>c expc..-ted 10 rccm-er 
eighty perceat of that amount [m a b:mbuptey proceeding). After pa)'IDCIIt of the proceeds 
of the asset securitization to the bank. such a tort creditor \\-ould have been able to cchii:'.'C 
only a nominal recovay. The investors who rcpboed the lr.uJks in J!xxOD's fmanciaJ SUUC• 
ture-the purchasers ofsecurities in the 3SSet securitization-v.'Ould be the absoJute OV.'DCS 
ofalllbe assets wed in Exxon's business. That is judgment proofmg. 
Id. 
209. CNH Copiuzl Prices Lo'llest ABS Transaction in Company History; Fim Tran.sadion Sinu 
me'ller of Case Corporation tmti New HoUtmtl N. V., Bus. WIRE, Mar. 9, :WOO, m-ailable Ill LEXIS, 
News Llb:ary, Bwiie File ("CNH Capital will apply the proceeds from Ibis securidzation to ttpOy 
outstlllding debt and fUnd its growing portfoUo of m:civnblcs.");set o1so l.oPucki, The lrrefotable 
Logic,supmnote IJ,at59o.2J. 
210. See Minton et aJ.. sopm note SO, atS-10. 
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unsecured creditors.211 Ifa finn uses the proceeds from a securitization of 
a "low risk" asset to invest in "riskier activities," such investment is made 
at the expense of its unsecured creditors and shareholders.212 In addition, 
securitization proceeds could be spent on negative net present value in­
vestments, in cases where mana~ were seeking to "avoid the discipli­
nary effects ofpoor perfonnance."213 
If the securitization of a finn's liquid assets (such as receivables) re­
sults in an overall drop in a firm's liquidity (as would be the case if the 
securitization proceeds were used to cover current expenses, pay current 
debt, were distributed as dividends or were invested in non-liquid assets), 
the diminished cash flow may in time result in a higher incidence of pay­
ment (or covenanti14 defaults to a firm's later creditors. If such cash flow 
deficiencies persist, the chance of a firm's overall cash flow insolvency215 
will be increased, thus leading the debtor to seek bankruptcy protection.216 
Bankruptcy has the potential to harm not only a firm's creditors, but also a 
firm's equity owners by requirin~ full payment to creditors before equity 
holders' interests can be retained. 17 Thus, the greater the chance of bank­
ruptcy, the greater the chance that a securitizing firm's owners will lose the 
value oftheir equity interest 218 
211. lei. 

212 lei. 

213. M'mton etal.,&lp7Q note SO,at9,(cmngl.angetal.,.nqranole 179, atJ-38). Citing the Llllljl, 
Poulsen and StuJz study, Minton's article conllnues: 
[A]ssetsales may allow non valuo-m..imizlng managers to pursue poor projects by creating 
liquidity fur Investment Asset securitization oan be viewed ln a simUar vein. Asset-backed 
proceeds oan be reinvested in poor projocts. Altcmalively, the proceeds li:om the sole ofos• 
set-backed debt can be used to retiJe cxistlng debt thereby lowering the firm's future pay· 
outs and thelllcciUmod that the111811!ger will have to face the discipline of the capital mar· 
kcls. In addition, firms that issue asset-backed debt may face less discipline li:om capital 
llllUkc:ts than firms that issue unsecun:d debt ifasset-backed deals involve less monltorlng 
by capital markets. lflbis motivales issuers, than shareholders offirms that securitize would 
experience wealth losses. Firms that gen.-Ja:ge cash 11ows but have low growth oppor­
bmlties face the greatcsl pressure to invest in unprofitable projects, therefore, we would ex­
peel the issuing firms to have these ebaractcristies. 
lei. at9-10. 
214. Events ofdefault ln a crcdltor's loan documentation may include the payment delays or lntcr­
ruptions, lililure to make payments to lhiRI parties, judgment mditor obtalnlng possession ofcollatcrnl 
and breach ofwananties or covenant See RICHARDT. NASSBERG, 1HE LENDER'S HANI>JIOOK 151-53 
(1986). 
215. "Cash llow lnsclvency" is commonly defined as debtor's Inability 10 pay its debts os they 
b=mc due. Section 101(32)(A) of the Banlauplcy Code defines a flml os •msolvent" If"the sum of 
such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at fair valuntion." II U.S.C. § 
101(32)(A) (1997). This is commonly known as "balance sheet insolvenay." 
216. See M'mton et al.,IIII[Jra note SO, at 7 (concluding that firms that sccurilizo are much closer to 
financial distress than firms that do not). 
217. See II U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1997). The filndemental maxim that creditors must be paid before 
equity DWnCJS is known as the "absoiUlc priority Iulc." BLACK'S LAW DICUONARY 7 (7th ed. 1999). 
218. See Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street P'shlp, 526 U.S. 434 
(1999); see also In,.. Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F3d 899 (9th Cit. 1993), cert. granted, SIO U.S. 1039 
239 2000] CIRCUMVENTION OF mE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
While the risk of improvident or short-sighted proceeds investment is 
also present when a firm offers collateral as security, secured creditor 
monitoring of both the collateral's value and the debtor's business enter­
prise as a whole provides some protection for the secured creditor, as well 
as potential protection for the debtor's other creditors. The secured credi­
tor, whose primary interest is in the debtor's repayment, will be alert for 
signs of debtor's imprudent decision making, undue risk-taking and mis­
management Moreover, since the secured creditor's secondary interest is 
in the value and efficacy of its collateral, it will take great pains to ensure 
that the debtor does not engage in acts that will jeopardize the value of its 
collateral. In addition to subjecting a debtor to the attention and scrutiny of 
a secured creditor, security provides leverage for the enforcement of loan 
covenants, including covenants addressing the issue of how loan proceeds 
are invested and the tolerable level of riskiness of investments.219 Secured 
creditors' ability to present the threat of foreclosure, coupled with cove­
nants in loan documents have been found to significantly increase the 
debtor's willingness and ability to repay its creditors.220 
In contrast. securitization investors have no incentive to monitor the 
debtor's post-securitization behavior. Once they purchase the debtor's 
assets, their link with the debtor is severed. While securitization investors 
will, as an initial matter, evaluate the quality of the assets being 
securitized,221 once that assessment is complete, they have no reason to be 
interested in the impact of the sale ofits assets on the debtor, the debtor's 
other creditors or what is done with the sale proceeds.222 Thus, securitiza­
tion provides no public monitoring for the benefit of a debtor's other 
creditors, nor private monitoring of the debtor's business decision-making, 
including the use of the financing proceeds. 223 There is no psychological 
leverage, such as that exerted by secured creditors' ability to foreclose on 
collateral, to encourage a securitizing originator to abstain from using its 
cash as fast as it arrives in an attempt to stay afloat Thus, a securitizating 
fum has a greater chance of having little, if any cash at the time it ulti­
mately files for bankruptcy. 
Investors who provide financing to fums through their purchase of 
(1994). vaaztedas moor, 511 U.S. 100:Z (1994) (nolillg lhc extent 10 wbicb nbsolulc priorlty1111caff<CIS 
lhe inrerest of a debtor's equity holders). 
219. Scott,.supnz nDle 34,at 1450, citing Robert 1!. Scott, A Relational ThtoryofSer:urtd Financing, 
86 CoLUM. L REv. 901, 945 (1986). See also Ronold J. Mmm. E>pWning lht PIJlltm ofStcurrd 
Credit, 110 HARv. L REv. 625,625 (1997). 
220. See Mann.mpnz note219, at 638-39,647-48. 
221. Seeurilizalion inveslms also cvalual.: lbc quality aod =nt of aoy acdit cnbaoC<IIl:IIL Se. 
Lupica, supnz note 48, at 620. 
222. Seeid.at627-29. 
223. See Sao! Levmore, Moniror:s ond Free Ridtr:s In Commerritrl ond CorporaJe Seaings, 92 YAlE 
W. 49,53-54 (1982) (aolillg lbe distinction between pabllc monitoriag for third p:uly beacfit nod 
private monitoriag fora secured party's benefit). 
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asset-backed securities are not required to participate in that firm's bank­
ruptcy proceedings;224 by contract, they opt out of the process of the fi­
nancing-seeking firm's potential collective debt recovexy process. Upon 
the financing-seeking firm's bankruptcy, these investors take their assets 
and go home, leaving whatever assets remain for the repayment of the 
debtor's unsecured creditors. Indeed, this is the most attractive feature of 
securitization as a financing method to originating firms: the ability to cre­
ate a "bankruptcy-proof' financing structure, thus lowering the risk of non­
payment to investors, in turn lowering the originating firm's financing 
costs relative to the cost of secured credit.225 • 
It has been argued with respect to securitization that "[t]he possibility 
that securitization or other financing techniques might be misused should 
not undermine their overall legitimacy.'= As illustrated by the scholar­
ship describing securitization as a strategy for judgment proofing, securiti­
zation has been, 227 and may continue to be, used in ignoble ways to avoid 
liability to tort and other creditors. Nevertheless, securitization presents 
the prospect-even when an originator intends not to judgment proof itself, 
but to simply finance its operations at a favorable rate-of expropriating 
the value of claims of existing or later unsecured creditors and sharehold­
ers. 
D. The Need for Further Study 
Third party creditors and other stakeholders will be subject to signifi­
cant harm from the further proliferation of securitization. Moreover, secu­
ritization has the potential to adversely impact not only the debtor's other 
creditors, but the value of the debtor's equity. The drafters of Revised Ar­
ticle 9 and the Bankruptcy Code amendments have relied upon the unchal­
lenged assumption that the more securitization, the better. The arguments 
supporting the conclusion that this assumption is fallacious are sound, but 
they have not been definitively proven. Nor have there been extensive 
224. See, t.g.• Boyd v. United Slates of America/FmHA (In re Boyd). II F.3d 59 (Sib Cir. 1994) 
(denying property, trausferred by debtor as included iD debtor's bankruptcy eslate). But see CarJson, 
supra note 93, at 1064 (arguiDg tbat because debtor retains some residual iDterest iD assets sold in 
COilDection with a securitization, sueh assets should properly be returned to debtor's estate upon a 
bankJupleY filing). 
225. See ROSEl<ll!AL & OcAMPO, supra note 48. at 8·23 (outlining securitization's benefits to origi­
nators). PuBuant to the Modigliani and MiUer tbecny, bowever, while securitization may reduce the 
cost of financing to the originator relative to an alternative financing method, this savings may be offset 
by a corresponding interest rate increase cbarged by the firm's general creditors. &e Frost, supra note 
199, at 116-20, 124. This is true to the extent tbat debtor's general creditors bavc sufficient resources 
and information to adjust their interest rate in reaction to fJe added risks of securitization. See ld. nt 
118, 124: see also Lupica, supra note 48, at 635. 
226. Schwarcz. The Inherent lrratiolllllity ofJudgment Proofing, supra note 170, at 14. 
2ZI. See Christopher Dlew & Andy Newman, Taxi Owners Ddtly Dodge Claims ofAccidtnr VIc· 
tims, N.Y. 'nMEs, May 24, 1998, at I, cited in LoPucki, The 1"(/Utab/e logic, supra note II, nt 61 
D.33. 
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studies demonstrating securitization's inefficiency, at the expense of third 
parties.228 
Clearly, there is an infonnation gap that must be bridged. One of the 
reasons offered for this infonnation gap is the lack of widespread judicial 
scrutiny of securitization transactions. AJ; argued by Professor Randal C. 
Picker on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference in his testimony 
before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Administrative Oversight and The Courts: 
These issues are unresolved, because there have been almost 
no cases addressing the consequences of securitization in bank­
ruptcy. There are a handful of unreported opinions and almost no 
reported opinions. We are not learning, because we are not liti­
gating. Usually, judicial development of an area gives us a full 
sense of the issues raised by any new practice. It is the interaction 
of case law and legislation that is the genius of the American Sys­
tem. We will artificially truncate this process were Congress to 
adopt the broad exemptions set forth in Section [903].229 
Because of the significant prospect of securitization, used as a financ­
ing strategy, adversely affecting an originator's unsecured creditors and 
other parties with interests in the originator, it is important that we learn all 
we can before changes of this magnitude are enacted. 
Vll. CONCLUSION 
Many of the changes found in both Revised Article 9 and the Bank­
ruptcy Reform Act of 2000 go a long way toward minimizing some of the 
structural risks attendant to securitization transactions. The extent of asset 
purchasers' obligations to comply with the filing requirements of Article 9 
will be clearer. Investors will have greater confidence in the efficacy of 
their interests in securities backed by what are proceeds of assets originally 
transferred at the time of the transactions, which becomes significant in the 
event of bankruptcy. Anti-assignment provisions found in contract and in 
law will be more thoroughly and completely eliminated, paving the way for 
smoother asset transfers. Moreover, the proposed revision to § 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code excepting assets the originator intended to securitize will 
allow ABS investors the luxury of avoiding the bankruptcy quagmire. 
Clearly, when Revised Article 9 is enacted by the state legislatures and if 
the equivalent of Senate bill 833 § 903 is enacted into law, ABS investors 
will gain greater certainty and predictability and protection from the exter­
nal effects of bankruptcy. This should result in an even greater increase in 
228. See Lupica. .supm note 48. at 599 n.ll (desoribing !be lllltlln: of !be cmpiricol studies lh:n need 
to be conducted). 
229. PickerTestimony•.supra note 160. 
242 CONNECf/CUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:199 
the dollar volume of securitized debt. 
These statutory revisions address the structural risks to which securi· 
tizing originators and ABS investors are subject. They do not. however, 
adequately consider the economic risks or third party effects of the further 
proliferation of securitization transactions. Moreover, the decision on the 
part of Congress to alter fundamentally the core of our country's business 
bankruptcy system-in what could be called a stealth manner-is at best, 
premature. The revisions to Article 9 designed to facilitate securitization 
will result in fewer unencumbered assets available upon bankruptcy for 
debtor's residual claimants bankruptcy, rendering many securitization 
originators essentially judgment proof. Moreover, an entire class of in· 
vestors (purchasers of investment rated ABS) need no longer concern 
themselves with the effects of a debtor's bankruptcy. If it is in the best 
interest of society as a whole to reform the business bankruptcy system or 
to substitute private contractual alternatives, then that is what ought to be 
done. What should not take place is a circumvention of the bankruptcy 
process by a discrete class of powerful financial market participants at the 
expense of those parties least able to bear the resulting loss. Until the nor· 
mative issues raise in this Article are fully considered, the law should not 
be so drastically changed. 
